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Studies on the differential contributions of the cere­
bral hemispheres to human experience and behavior have demon­
strated that the hemispheres are lateralized for cognitive 
strategies and, possibly, for emotional valance. Recently 
researchers have demonstrated that the hemispheres may also 
be lateralized for certain personality disorders and person­
ality traits. Using lateral eye movements as a measure of 
hemispheric activation, Dawson, Tucker, and Swenson (in 
preparation) have shown that certain self-description ques­
tionnaires may serve to discriminate subjects who character­
istically utilize one hemisphere over the other, regardless 
of the relative adaptiveness of the cognitive strengths of 
that hemisphere for the task at hand.
This study replicated the findings of the Dawson et 
al. study, using brain wave activity as an index of later­
alized activation. Separating subjects on the basis of 
their scores on self-description personality measures, it 
was discovered that subjects who were unrealistically favor­
able in their self-descriptions (deniers) evidenced greater 
right hemisphere activation, regardless of the task being 
performed. Subjects who were overly critical in their 
self-descriptions (critics) evidenced symmetrical hemis­
pheric activation with a tendency toward greater left
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hemispheric activation, particularly evident during the base­
line and spatial tasks. These findings were evidenced in 
both the theta and alpha bands for average power, with com­
parisons in the theta band demonstrating the clearest per­
sonality related effects. Analyses on coherence data were 
performed and described without interpretation.
The results of this study were used to provide support 
for a theory of hemispheric personality. A model is built 
on the research findings on lateralized cognition and then 
extended to address some of the recent controversies in the 
lateralization literature. Implications for further research 
are discussed and suggestions of how such a model might be 





Research in neurology and neuropsychology has provided 
preliminary results suggesting that the two hemispheres of 
the brain contribute differentially to cognition, emotion, 
and personality. From early observations of brain damaged 
patients to more sophisticated present techniques of com­
puterized axial tomography and position emission tomography 
scanning, researchers have been able to demonstrate that 
each hemisphere contributes specific perceptual approaches 
and cognitive processing styles. Although it is not actually 
correct to speak of either hemisphere as completely control­
ling specific types of processing, due to the massive inter­
connections between the hemispheres, it may still be heuris­
tic to describe a "hemispheric style" for an individual.
Essentially, the concept of "hemispheric style" sug­
gests that, even though the hemispheres are intimately 
linked, through the anterior, posterior, and callosal com­
missures, a particular hemisphere may come to serve a more 
prominent role in the processing of a certain type of task. 
Beyond the relative contributions of each hemisphere to 
specific types of tasks, some evidence suggests an indi­
vidual may come to rely more heavily on the processing
1
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mode of a particular hemisphere to approach a variety of 
situations and tasks.
In order to understand how an individual might come to 
use a specific "hemispheric style," regardless of whether or 
not the characteristic processing style of that hemisphere 
is conducive to the performance of a particular task, it is 
important to gain a basic understanding of the differential 
contributions of the hemispheres to cognition, emotion, and 
personality. This paper presents a brief, general overview 
of some of the representative research findings in each of 
these areas and then suggests a model, based mostly on 
neuropsychological findings of lateralized cognition, which 
might serve as a heuristic framework with which to under­
stand normal integrative functioning.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Lateralized Cognition
The research on lateralized cognition has provided 
fairly consistent findings. Overall it appears that the 
right hemisphere is more responsible for spatial, holistic, 
and gestalt-like perception and cognition while the left 
hemisphere is credited with sequential and logical perception 
and cognition. Evidence for such a model has emerged from 
research, on both brain-damaged and normal subjects.
Assuming that hemispheric damage is directly related 
to cognitive deficits that appear after the trauma, researchers 
have shown that the left hemisphere is particularly impor­
tant for control of speech (Bogen 1969; Day & Ulatowska 
1979; Gazzaniga 1970; Lansdel 1961; Ornstein 1978), and is 
required for performing verbal tasks (Benton 1962; Bogen 
1969; Lansdell 1962; Wexler 1980); auditory tasks (Day & 
Ulatowska 1979); sequential/analytic processing (Bogen 1969; 
Galin 1974; Sperry 1968); propositional thinking (Bogen 
1969; Galin 1974); musical understanding (Hacaen 1962); 
tasks requiring extraction of relevant details and symbolic 
representation of elements (Day & Ulatowska 1970; Nebes 
1974); digit tasks (White 1969); writing tasks (Gazzaniga
3
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1970; Ornstein 1978); and tasks of fine motor coordination 
(Day & Ulatowska 1979).
While the left hemisphere thus appears to be particu­
larly important for verbal, sequential and analytic cogni­
tive processing, the right hemisphere appears to be more im­
portant for spatial, non-verbal, and gestalt-like processing. 
Right hemisphere strengths include: facial recognition 
(Benton & Van Allen 1968; Wexler 1980); spatial perception 
(McGlone & Davidson 1973; Nebes 1974; Semmes 1968; White 
1969); visual memory (Day & Ulatowska 1979); integrating 
sensory information (Galin 1974); non-verbal communication 
(Bogen 1969; Galin 1974; McGlone & Davidson 1973); apposi- 
tional thinking (Bogen 1969; Galin 1974); recognition of 
musical sounds (Bogen 1969); visual perception and visual/ 
motor skills (Day & Ulatowska 1979); musical perception 
(Milner 1962; Ornstein 1978; White 1969); and faster reac­
tion times (Sperry, Zaidel, & Zaidel 1979).
As well as finding functional deficits that seem to 
correlate with hemispheric damage, other researchers have 
shown that the hemispheres are anatomically and neuro- 
chemically different. Lansdell (1967) has shown that task 
performance deficits were proportional to the amount of 
ablated left temporal cerebrum, while damage within the 
right hemisphere did not appear to significantly correlate 
with task performance. Lansdell hypothesized that the 
left hemisphere is more focally organized while the right
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hemisphere is more diffusely organized. Recent support for 
such a hypothesis has been demonstrated by Gur (1980), who 
found a greater ratio of white to grey matter in the right 
hemisphere. The author suggests that this finding may indi­
cate a greater hemispheric interconnectedness in the right 
h emisphere and therefore less regional specificity than 
may be found in the left hemisphere. This would suggest 
that both the localizationists and organismic theorists 
(Goldstein 1948) were correct in their description of func­
tional representation within the hemispheres. It would ap­
pear that the left hemisphere is more localized, having 
specific areas responsible for specific types of process­
ing, while the right hemisphere may be more holistically 
oriented, with each part of the right hemisphere containing 
some type of "holographic" representation of function 
throughout the entire hemisphere.
Semmes (1968) also suggested that the left hemisphere 
is more focally oriented than the right. She suggested 
that the left hemisphere is more adapted for manual tasks 
and speech while the right hemisphere appears more dif­
fusely organized and therefore better suited for associating 
dissimilar units of information, as in the synthesis of 
sensory and motor input, and performing spatial tasks.
Tucker (1981) reviewed the results of Semmes and Lansdell 
and suggested that, since the anatomical differences of 
the hemispheres appear to heuristically parallel the basic
6
cognitive differences of the hemispheres, the hemispheres' 
differential ability may be a function of, or facilitated 
by, their differential neural and anatomical structure.
In another study suggesting anatomical differences 
between the hemispheres, Galaburda, LeMay, Kemper & Gesch- 
wind (1978), using computerized axial tomography, demonstrated 
that the right frontal lobe is larger than the left frontal 
lobe, whereas the left posterior region is larger than the 
right posterior region. The suggestion here is that these 
differences in anatomical size may be adaptive for perform­
ing differential types of functions within the hemispheres. 
Although it is clear that these differences exist, it is not 
certain what these differences mean (Tucker, Roth, & Bair 
1982 ) .
In a neurochemical study, Oke, Keller, Mefford and 
Adams (1978) found that the amounts of certain neurotrans­
mitters seem to be lateralized. In a study measuring amounts 
of neurotransmitters from the hemispheres, Oke et al. found 
the presence of norephinepherine to be differentially 
lateralized within the thalamus such that projections to 
the right hemisphere appear to contain more norephinepherine. 
Although the specific implications of these findings are 
not readily apparent, the fact that the hemispheres are 
structured and neurochemically distributed differentially 
lends support to the notion that they are functionally
l
differentiated subsystems, of the brain.
7
Research on Normal Subjects
Thus far, research has been reviewed that suggests 
that each hemisphere has a distinct role in differential 
organizing and processing of information. Although the evi­
dence presented so far appears to present a rather consistent 
set of findings suggesting that the hemispheres are both 
neuroanatomically/neurochemically and functionally different, 
much of this research was performed on patients with some 
type of brain abnormality, thereby making generalizations to 
normals tentative. Unfortunately, research with normals 
has been hindred by lack of valid, non-intrusive measurement 
tools.
In order to perform research on normals it has been 
necessary to restrict stimulus impact to one hemisphere or 
the other, at least for initial presentation. The right side 
of the brain receives the majority of its perceptual infor­
mation from the left side of the body while the left hemis­
phere receives its stimuli from the right. This lateraliza­
tion is also true for efferent conduction. Thus, researchers 
have utilized visual half-field performance (Kimura 1966; 
Kinsbourne 1970), dichotic auditory listening task perfor­
mance (Kimura 1967; Safer & Leventhal 1977) and lateral eye 
movements (Bakan 1969; Crouch 1976; Weiten & Etaugh 1974;
Gur, Gur, & Harris 1975). These various methodologies have 
all demonstrated results consistent with the previous 
findings on brain damaged and/or brain anomaly patients.
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In sum, the evidence from the research on lateralized 
perceptual and cognitive styles reliably demonstrates a 
lateralized difference between the hemispheres. The left 
hemisphere appears to provide relative superiority in logi­
cal, sequential, and analytical processing while the right 
hemisphere appears to be more important to performing spa­
tial, nonverbal, gestalt-like perception and processing.
Although research in lateralized cognitive processing 
has generally provided consistent results, two recent studies 
have cast doubt on the reliability of this model. In a re­
cent, highly controlled set of studies, Gevins, Zeitlin, 
Yingling, Doyle, Dedon, Schaffer, Roumasset, and Yeager (1979) 
and Gevins, Zeitlin, Doyle, Schaffer, and Callaway (1979) 
have demonstrated that "no evidence for lateralization of 
different types of cognitive activity was found in the EEG" 
(Gevins, Doyle, Schaffer, Callaway & Yeager 1980, p. 1006).
While the findings of the Gevins et al. studies are 
disconcerting, their results may suggest that some uncon­
sidered confounding variable may exist which can signifi­
cantly diminish lateralized task effects. Reviewing the 
Gevins et al. studies, Davidson and Ehrlichman (1980) postu­
late that the different methods and non-equivalent spatial 
tasks used across the two experiments of Gevins et al. may 
have led to the authors' inability to find lateralized cog­
nitive effects. This paper will attempt to explore the ef­
fects of yet another possibly confounding variable that 
could account for the lack of lateralized results in the
9
Gevins et al. studies. By reviewing some of the literature 
to date in the areas of cognition, emotion and personality, 
this paper will attempt to construct a model to account for 
some of the confounding variance within the research on 
lateralized cognition and provide a heuristic framework with 
which to interpret results from the research on lateralized 
emotion.
Lateralized Emotion
Research striving to uncover the differential contri­
butions of the hemispheres to emotion and personality has 
often been confusing and contradictory. Essentially, three 
different views have evolved, each with an explanation of 
how the hemispheres are important in emotion and personality. 
The first view suggests that the right hemisphere subserves 
emotional functioning while the left hemisphere appears to 
be a relatively non-emotional processor which can provide 
some inhibitory or modulatory effects on the emotional right 
hemisphere. Whereas the first view postulates that one 
hemisphere basically houses emotion, the other two views 
hypothesize that the nemispheres are differentially later­
alized for positive and negative emotion. The second view 
holds that the left hemisphere is associated with positive 
emotion, while the right hemisphere is associated with nega­
tive emotion. Although the third view also hypothesizes 
lateralized emotional valances, it asserts that the hemis­
pheric valances are the opposite of those postulated in the 
second view, that is, the left hemisphere is associated
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with negative emotion while the right hemisphere is associ­
ated with positive emotion.
In support of the first view, Heilman, Scholes, and 
Watson (1975) asked patients to judge the emotional tones of 
a speaker and found that patients with right hemispheric 
dysfunction were deficient in their ability to comprehend 
the emotional tone of speech. Tucker, Watson and Heilman 
(1976) replicated Heilman et al.'s findings (1975) and 
further demonstrated that right hemisphere damaged patients 
were also deficient in their ability to express emotion.
This latter finding has been recently replicated by Ross 
and Mesulam (1979) who found that two right hemisphere 
(frontal) damaged patients had difficulty utilizing emo­
tional inflections in everyday communications. In another 
experiment, Sackeim, Gur and Saucy (1978) had subjects judge 
right and left facial composites for emotional expressive­
ness. The authors found that left facial composites, when 
compared to right facial composites, were judged as expres­
sing emotion more intensely. Assuming that the right hemis­
phere has greater control over most left facial muscles, 
the authors concluded that the right hemisphere exerts 
greater control over the production of emotional expression 
than does the left.
Making the same assumption as Sackeim et al. (1978), 
Schwartz, Ahern and Brown (1979) measured right versus left 
facial muscle responses and found that left facial muscles 
were more active than right in negative emotion, while right
11
facial muscles were more responsive during positive emotion. 
The implication of this study is that the hemispheres con­
tribute differentially to emotion such that the right hemis­
phere is more active during negative affect and the left 
hemisphere is more active during positive affect. This find 
ing is representative of the second view which postulates 
that each hemisphere is differentially active during emotion 
with the left hemisphere being more active during positive 
emotion and the right hemisphere being more active during 
negative emotion. In further support of this contention, 
Dimond, Farrington, and Johnson (1976) have shown that films 
presented to the right hemisphere were judged to be more un­
pleasant while evaluations of films presented to the left 
hemisphere did not differ from evaluations of films pre­
sented simultaneously to both hemispheres. The authors con­
cluded that the right hemisphere appears to contribute most 
heavily to the experience of negative emotion. Lastly,
Ahern and Schwartz (1979) found that positive emotionally 
reflective questions elicited more eye movements to the 
right (left hemispheric processing) while negative emo­
tional questions elicited more left lateral eye movements 
(right hemispheric activation).
While the previous researchers postulated that the 
left hemisphere is important for positive emotion and the 
right hemisphere is important for negative emotion, other 
researchers, holding the third view of emotion, have
12
interpreted their findings to suggest that the right hemis­
phere is associated with positive emotion while the left 
hemisphere is associated with negative emotion. Assuming 
that damage to a hemisphere disinhibits that hemisphere's 
activation characteristic of its emotional valance, several 
authors have reported results consistent with the third view. 
Gainotti (1972a, 1972b) examined 160 patients (80 with left 
lesions and 80 with right lesions) and found that catas­
trophic or anxiety depression was more frequent among left 
hemisphere damaged patients, while spatial neglect, uni­
lateral alterations of body schema and euphoria reactions 
were more often associated with lesions of the right hemis­
phere. Black (1975) and Gasparrini, Satz, Heilman and Coo- 
lidge (1978) have shown that patients with left hemisphere 
damage report significantly higher scores on the depression 
scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI) than do right hemisphere damaged patients. Reporting 
similar findings, Bear and Fedio (1977) found that left 
temporal lobe epileptics described themselves in more 
"catastrophic"/depressive terms than did right temporal 
lobe epileptics. In fact, right temporal lobe epileptic 
patients appeared to be unaware of their deficits. Inter­
estingly, Bear and Fedio also employed an observer rating 
scale and found that, while left temporal lobe epileptics 
described themselves as more severely disturbed than right 
temporal lobe epileptics, observers rated right temporal 
lobe epileptic patients as being more disturbed. In
13
addition to providing support for a lateralized emotion 
model, Bear and Fedio's study raises an important question 
of research design. It would appear that patients' self- 
report may vary significantly from observer ratings. A 
replication of the major features of Bear and Fedio's find­
ings has recently been reported (Strauss, personal communi­
cation) .
As evidenced in the foregoing discussion, the research 
on differential hemispheric contributions to the experience 
of emotion is confusing and contradictory. While some re­
searchers proposed that only the right hemisphere contributes 
to emotion, other researchers have proposed that each hemis­
phere has a propensity toward a certain type of emotion (i.e., 
positive or negative) although which hemisphere contributes 
to what emotion is still in hot dispute. Contributing to 
the controversy is the assumption used to make the inter­
pretation of lateralized emotional balance. While some 
authors hold that damage to one hemisphere inhibits that 
hemisphere's contribution to emotional experience, other 
authors assert that the same damage disinhibits that hemis­
phere's contribution, thereby arriving at a completely op­
posite interpretation. For a more comprehensive review of 
this literature, see Tucker (1981).
14
A Personality Theory of Hemispheric Activation 
Hemispheric Integration
Thus far, the research presented indicates that the 
hemispheres are functionally differentiated for cognition 
and emotion. The suggestion of this research is that each 
hemisphere represents a unique cognitive and emotional style 
of gathering, processing, and acting on information. Assum­
ing the distinction between the hemispheres to be accurate, 
the generally smooth, immediate subjective experience of 
problem solving becomes difficult to reconcile with the func­
tional independence of the hemispheres in information acqui­
sition and processing. Specifically, looking at the evidence 
on cognitive differences, normal hemispheric functioning 
implies constant competition between two antithetical problem­
solving systems, yet subjective experience of problem solv­
ing is paradoxically smooth and conflict-free, even if it 
may be an illusion (Galin 1978).
In general, three theories describing hemispheric 
interrelation have addressed this problem. Nebes (1974) 
suggests that both hemispheres develop individual strategies 
for the task at hand and final choice of approach is resolved 
in favor of the hemisphere most adapted for that particular 
task. In a different vein, Bogen (1969) suggests that the 
"position of two independent problem-solving organs increases 
the prospects of a successful solution to a novel situation"
15
(p. 191). Basically, Bogen suggests that the individual 
hemispheres interact to gain harmonious/creative solutions, 
this being the most adaptive approach to problem-solving.
In support of this conjecture, Zaidel (1979), in a recent 
study of patients with corpus callosum commissurotomies, 
demonstrated that interhemispheric task solution was superior 
to independent hemispheric solution.
Although sponsoring a theory of mutual cooperation be­
tween the hemispheres, Bogen recognizes the possible "hazard 
of conflict in the event of different solutions" and sug­
gests that the "propositional" mode of the left hemisphere 
could inhibit the right hemisphere's "appositional" mode. 
Essentially agreeing with Bogen and using Freud's terms of 
secondary process and primary process for the processing 
styles of the left and right hemispheres respectively, Galin 
(1974) suggests a more dynamic model in which the left hemis­
phere (secondary process) inhibits the right (primary pro­
cess). McLaughlin (1978) eloquently expanded Galin's model 
in describing the parallels between hemispheric processing 
and the psychoanalytic model. He further suggests that 
these processes continue throughout life, interactively in­
hibiting and facilitating each other's growth and develop­
ment .
Finally, in contrast to the previously presented views 
of conflict resolution between the differential approaches 
of the hemispheres, Ornstein (1978) suggests that the
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hemispheres do not compete for ascendency in performing a 
given task, nor is the determination always made in favor 
of the most appropriate processing style for a given task. 
Ornstein selected two groups of subjects, lawyers and 
ceramicists, in order to test this hypothesis, and found 
that lawyers (considered to use more verbal and analytical 
skills) used their left hemispheres more (as measured by 
electroencephalograph recordings) regardless of task demand, 
than did ceramicists (considered to use more spatial/ 
holistic skills). Ornstein concludes "apparently the hemis­
pheres are specialized for the kind of thought or informa­
tion a person chooses to use, not necessarily for the type 
of material he confronts" and that the hemispheres are "not 
specialized for different types of material (verbal and spa­
tial), but for different types of thought" (Ornstein 1978,
pp. 81, 82).
Ornstein's proposal of hemispheric utilization is radi­
cal in that it hypothesizes that the hemispheres are speci­
alized for "thought" and the person "chooses" what material 
he will use. The concept of "choice," as an organizing 
principle for utilization of specific hemispheric skills, 
will be elaborated later in a hypothesis suggesting that 
"choice," as defined by Ornstein, is a function of the in­
dividual's personality, which ultimately directs hemis­
pheric utilization in perceptual information selection and
task solution.
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Personality Theory of Hemispheric Activation
Thus far, evidence has been presented suggesting that 
the hemispheres are specialized for different types of cog­
nition and emotional experience. Yet, while the evidence 
appears to delineate two semi-autonomous organs that provide 
separate and sometimes antithetical solutions, human subjec­
tive experience and behavioral performance suggests a unity 
of approach, resolution and feeling (Galin 1978). In other 
words, typical human subjective experience and behavioral 
performance would seem to suggest that there exists an under­
lying organization or principle that preselects or instan­
taneously selects one hemispheric style or the other.
One theorist who speaks to this issue is Ornstein 
(1978). Ornstein's theory (1978) of hemispheric utilization 
suggests that the underlying principle that may govern pre­
selection or selection of hemispheric utilization is human 
choice. Although Ornstein is apparently referring to the 
cognitive characteristics of the hemispheres, it seems 
reasonable that this theory might also suggest the mechanism 
for emotional experience. In fact the distinction between 
cognition and emotion may be more arbitrary than real.
Tucker (1981), in a recent review of the literature, states 
that "It thus may be necessary to accept the interdependence 
between cognition and affective arousal as going both ways, 
with emotion emerging not only from a post hoc cognitive 
evaluation of an arousal state, but also from the operation
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of neurophysiological process which can excite or attenuate 
cognitive activity" (Tucker 1981, p. 62).
Drawing upon Ornstein's theory of hemispheric utiliza­
tion and Tucker's suggestion of the interdependence of cog­
nition and affective arousal, it is possible to postulate a 
theoretical framework within which to view the relationship 
of cognition and affect, and account for an individual's unique 
manner of approaching emotional experience. This framework 
will be referred to as a personality theory.
In essence, a personality theory of hemispheric acti­
vation would suggest that the hemispheres are not only dif­
ferentiated for "types of thought" as Ornstein suggests 
(i.e., verbal and spatial), but also for types of emotional 
experience, and that these two elements are interconnected.
In other words, this theory suggests that the type of cogni­
tion a hemisphere employs dictates the type of affective 
arousal (and vice versa), and hemispheric selection is the 
result of an individual's unique background, genetic makeup, 
and social interactions, that is, his personality.
In order to characterize the interdependence of cogni­
tion and emotion within a hemisphere, it is necessary to 
begin with the evidence on cognitive differences between 
the hemispheres and consider how these are relevant to 
lateralized emotional processes. For example, the right 
hemisphere's propensity for non-verbal and holistic cogni­
tion and perception would seem to facilitate immediate,
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undifferentiated, and affectively-charged experience and/or 
expression. These experiences and expressions would be 
"felt" and less available to verbal description and analy­
tic recall or modifiable by verbal, logical and sequential 
thinking and discussion than information processed by the 
left hemisphere. In fact, recall for the right hemisphere 
might best be facilitated by entering a similar relationship, 
situation, or emotional experience, because right hemis­
pheric storage of this information occurs in a fusion of 
experience into a single, syncretic (Tucker 1981), holistic 
concept. Specific emotions would be experienced and ex­
pressed intensely and undifferentially, increasing the pos­
sibility of distortion of the factual information or situa­
tion .
In contrast to the global, undifferentiated cognitive 
structure and perceptual approach of the right hemisphere, 
the left hemisphere provides a more sequential and analyti­
cal approach, often involving symbolic representation 
through words and digits. By accurately defining and separ­
ating various components of cognition and affect, the left 
hemisphere would be able to utilize various components of 
an experience separately in order to arrive at an expres­
sion. Therefore, the left hemisphere would be capable of 
representing a given event in a purely cognitive form, 
divorced from its emotional elements.
The preceding model discusses affect in terms of gen­
eral implications from the lateralized cognitive research.
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That is, instead of describing the hemispheres as later- 
alized for positive or negative emotion this model regards 
the hemispheres as being lateralized for the cognitive pro­
cessing style with which a hemisphere characteristically 
experiences and expresses emotion, both positive and nega­
tive. The right hemispheric personality type (i.e., person 
who relies basically on his right hemisphere processing 
style) would therefore express both positive and negative 
affect in an unmodulated fashion. Negative affect would be 
experienced as devastating, and an individual may have dif­
ficulty identifying a precipitating event appropriate to the 
level of emotional response. Yet, since the right hemis­
pheric processes are less available to verbal description 
and encoding, this negative affect might fade quickly with 
little verbal awareness or recollection of the intensity 
of the negative affective expression. Positive affect would 
most likely be experienced and expressed in the same manner 
as negative affect, with the individual demonstrating in­
tensely positive emotion which may be disproportionate to 
the situation. Once again, memory of the positive affective 
expression may be inaccurate, with the individual possibly 
deemphasizing the extent of his emotional expression.
Unlike the right hemispheric personality type,(the 
deniers), the left hemispheric personality type's (the 
critic's) characteristics of detail oriented perception, 
focused awareness, and verbal encoding would most likely
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aid him in accurate perceptions of his environment. These 
characteristics also would aid him in developing detailed, 
verbal memory stores which are easily retrievable. The 
critic's propensity toward critical evaluation of his en­
vironment could lead to a hypervigilant attentional style. 
Unlike the critic, the denier might evidence little outward 
emotional expression yet be intensely focused on whatever 
affective experience he might have, making him appear to be 
less affectively stimulated than he may report.
Even though neither style is discussed in terms of 
having a specific valence, observers of these individual 
styles may be likely to describe each as having a character­
istic valence. Assuming that neither style was observed dur­
ing an acute emotional event or trauma (e.g., flood, death 
of a loved one, winning of an award), the deniers' style of 
passive diffuse awareness and poor accessibility to emo­
tional memory may lead others to perceive that type as gen­
erally optimistic, vivacious and positive. Critics, on the 
other hand, may be perceived in a less favorable light.
The critic's propensity toward focused and vigilant aware­
ness, critical evaluation, and emotional regulation may 
cause others to generally perceive them to be pessimistic, 
reserved and negative.
Similar to Bear and Fedio's (1977) research with 
epileptics, the personality theory of hemispheric activa­
tion postulates that hemispheric personality types would
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describe themselves differently than would their observers. 
Should the personality model of hemispheric activation prove 
viable, it would imply that brain damage may serve to exag­
gerate the normal (intact) characteristic emotional style 
of the affected hemisphere. Further, the similarity of the 
model to Bear and Fedio's findings suggests that the psycho­
logical defense mechanisms of denial and obsessiveness may 
respectively describe the characteristic functioning of the 
right and left hemispheres.
These lateralized styles of emotional and cognitive 
functioning bear striking resemblance to two neurotic styles 
described by Shapiro (1965) in his book, Neurotic Styles. In 
general, Shapiro suggests that, for whatever reason (e.g., 
genetic, behavioral, psychosexual) an individual develops a 
characteristic matrix of thinking, experiencing, and feeling. 
This matrix then regulates the type and amount of perceptual 
information gathered, the processing performed, and the be­
havior exhibited. Shapiro further suggests that neurotic 
manifestations are consistent with this matrix. For example, 
Shapiro states that no one is surprised to hear that a very 
logical, exacting person chooses the profession of a book­
keeper and that, when a psychological problem occurs, it 
manifests itself as an obsessional type of neurosis.
Two basic matrices described by Shapiro are the 
obsessive-compulsive neurotic style and the hysterical 
neurotic style. The obsessive-compulsive style is
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characterized by analytical cognition with a great attention 
to detail, deliberate activity and expression. Shapiro states 
that maintenance of this vigilance to detail and purposeful 
activity calls for "tense deliberateness" that restricts 
the abilities of imagination, fantasizing, "whim, playful­
ness, and spontaneous action in general" (Shapiro 1965, p.
44). Shapiro also characterizes people with this style as 
dogmatic and worrisome. As can be seen from the preceding 
description, Shapiro's description of the obsessive-compulsive 
neurotic style is similar to that proposed for a left 
hemispheric personality style. A similarity is also evident 
between Shapiro's description of a hysteric neurotic style 
and the proposed personality style of the right hemisphere.
Shapiro describes the hysteric neurotic style as being 
more global, diffuse and impressionistic in cognition and 
perceptual approach. It is characterized by a relative ab­
sence of active, complex cognitive integration, and numerous 
emotional outbursts that are not truly representative of 
the hysteric's overall feelings. Shapiro also states that 
this neurotic style is particularly likely to utilize the 
psychological defense of repression, that is, "the loss 
not of affect but of ideational contents to achieve the 
status of conscious memory or of memories available to con­
sciousness" (Shapiro 1965, p. 109), or "to put it another 
way, the hysterical affect, like the cognition, does not 
emerge as a well-developed and articulated mental concept
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in a clearly focused well-differentiated awareness, but im­
mediately dominates and captures a diffuse and passive aware­
ness" (Shapiro 1965, p. 131).
Thus far, the hemispheric personality style model pos­
tulates that the hemispheres are specialized for certain 
interrelated types of cognition and emotion. By drawing a 
parallel to Shapiro's descriptions, it may be hypothesized 
that the right hemispheric personality style is congruent 
with an hysteric-like personality style. Evidence supporting 
such a hypothesis is provided by several studies. Relating 
a hysteric-like symptom (denial) and right hemisphere activa­
tion, Gur and Gur (1975) measured lateral eye movements of 
normal subjects and found that "left lookers" scored signifi­
cantly higher than right movers on Reversal, a subtest of 
the Defense Mechanism Inventory, which is considered to 
demonstrate defenses, such as repression, denial, negation 
and reaction formation that "deal with conflict by respond­
ing in a positive or neutral fashion to a frustrating ob­
ject. " The authors also found that "left lookers" evidence 
more psychosomatic symptomatology. Suggesting that hysteria 
and psychosomatic tendencies are linked, Sommerschield and 
Reyker (1973) have shown that the degree of repression (a 
hysteric defense mechanism) is related to the number of 
psychosomatic complaints and symptoms.
Other researchers have further demonstrated that 
psychosomatic difficulties are linked to hysteria and the
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right hemisphere. Galin, Dimond and Braff (1977) review­
ing the cases of female hysterics, found that a significant 
portion of them exhibited conversion symptoms on their left 
sides. Kenyon (1964) reviewed records of patients with uni­
lateral psychosomatic symptoms and also found that the symp­
toms were mostly evidenced on the left side. These find­
ings, plus Gur and Gur's findings on normals, suggest that 
the right hemisphere may be particularly important to hys­
terical defense mechanisms and symptomatology. Recently 
Mesulam (1981) described 12 patients with dissociative symp- 
tomotology who were seen over a one year period. A review 
of 10 of the 12 patients who evidenced abnormal EEGs showed 
a predilection for the non-dominant temporal lobe. The 
author hypothesizes that mental processes that originate 
in the non-dominant (i.e., right) hemisphere are more likely 
to lead to dissociative states, while processes arising in 
the dominant hemisphere are more likely to be accepted as 
part of the self. Dominant hemisphere traits were thought 
by the author to include aggressiveness, religiosity, and 
humorlessness.
In reviewing research on cognitive lateralization, it 
is apparent that the descriptions of left hemispheric func­
tions are congruent with Shapiro's description of the obses­
sive verbal, analytical style. Although the exact type of 
emotional expression of the obsessive-compulsive is not 
stated by Shapiro, it is not unreasonable to infer from
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Shapiro's descriptors of "tense deliberateness," worry, and 
dogma, that the left hemisphere's emotional expression might 
be one of tension or anxiety that, in times of stress, is 
characterized by negative self-statements and verbal rumina­
tions (i.e., depressive-like affect). Several studies have 
demonstrated just such a link between anxiety/depression 
and the left hemisphere.
Using brain damaged subjects, researchers have shown 
that patients with left hemisphere damage report more de­
pression (Black 1975; Dikmen & Reitan 1977; Gasparrini, Satz, 
Heilman, & Coolidge 1978) and anxiety (Dikmen & Reitan 1974) 
on the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory. In another study, 
using the lateral eye movements of normal subjects to indi­
cate hemispheric activation, Day (1967) found that right 
movers (i.e., left hemisphere) experience more anxiety and 
experience it as having an external locus.
In another approach researchers interrupted normal 
left hemisphere functioning by unilaterally injecting sodium 
amytal in the brains of pre-surgery patients to determine 
speech lateralization (Rossi & Rosadini 1967; Terzian 1964) 
or by administering unilateral ECT (Deglin & Nikolaenko 
1975) to psychiatric patients. Although the subject popula­
tions were different, the results were the same. Assuming 
that unilateral ECT and amytal injections resulted in the 
disinhibition of the hemisphere under study, both sets of 
researchers found that left hemispheric disturbance (i.e.,
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injection or ECT) produced behavioral phenomena suggestive 
of a catastrophic depressive reaction, while induced disrup­
tion of the right hemisphere produced patient behavior sug­
gestive of euphoria. Reviewing patients with left hemis­
phere insults, Robinson and Szetela (1981) found that both 
patients having head trauma or stroke demonstrated clini­
cally significant depression (60% and 20%, respectively) and 
that when lesion location was controlled, the severity of 
the depression was directly correlated with the closeness of 
the lesion to the left frontal pole.
Specifically looking at anxiety and lateralized cere­
bral function, Tucker, Antes, Stenslie, and Barnhardt (1978) 
performed two experiments that indicated left hemispheric 
involvement in anxiety. In the first experiment they found 
that higher reported anxiety is associated with greater 
errors in the right visual half-field. Measuring lateral 
eye movements and auditory attentional bias, they performed 
a second experiment which demonstrated that reported trait 
anxiety is correlated with a decrease in left eye movements 
and a right ear attentional bias. The authors conclude that 
anxiety appears to be a left hemisphere phenomenon reducing 
the left hemisphere's ability to process hemisphere-specific 
perceptual information due to a hemispheric processing de­
mand overload.
Monakhov, Perris, Botskarov, von Knorring and Niki­
forov (1979) have also demonstrated a relationship between
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"anxiety-depression" and lateralized hemispheric involvement. 
The authors analyzed the EEG of 22 depressed patients. Al­
though patients were not differentiated by type of depression 
(e.g., unipolar, bipolar), distinctions between 12 depressive 
symptoms were made (e.g., depressed mood, psychic anxiety, 
motoric restlessness, thoughts of suicide). The 12 symptoms 
were then grouped into two scores, the first described as an 
"anxiety-depression" score and the second as an "inhibition- 
retardation" score. The authors found a pronounced inter- 
hemispheric correlation with alpha power for the "anxiety- 
depression" score, demonstrating major activity in the left 
precentral area.
In summary, each hemisphere appears to have a charac­
teristic form of cognition and emotion and, by exploring the 
interrelationship of these two characteristics, a general per­
sonality style can be attributed to each hemisphere. Through 
comparing this hemispheric personality style model to the 
clinically generated neurotic styles described by Shapiro 
(1965) it is possible to heuristically label the right hemis­
pheric personality style as being hysteric-like and charac­
terized by denial and the left hemisphere's as being obsessive- 
compulsive- like and characterized by self-criticism. Yet, 
although it is possible to generate personality style de­
scriptors for the two hemispheres, this model has only char­
acterized the hemispheres as discrete, functioning units.
In the following section the hemispheric interaction and over­
all individual experience will be explored.
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Personality
To this point, the personality theory of hemispheric 
activation (e.g., personality style theory) has been de­
veloped in such a way as to suggest that the hemispheres 
are differently characterized by certain types of inter­
related cognition and emotion, yet it has not been postu­
lated how two such diverse and antithetical personality styles 
exist within one individual. Once again returning to Orn- 
stein's concept of choice as an indicator of hemispheric 
utilization, it is reasonable to postulate that each hemis­
phere has its own style of cognitive and emotional function­
ing and that an individual will "preferentially rely on one 
hemisphere more than the other, regardless of the type of 
material that confronts him" (Ornstein 1978, p. 82). It 
would follow that the more an individual's overall person­
ality tends toward an extreme, the more that individual 
would rely on a particular hemisphere. Conversely, the less 
stylized the individual's personality, the more flexible 
would be his response pattern and, ergo, his hemispheric 
utilization. In terms of hemisphere utilization the idiom 
"well-balanced" may literally mean just that.
In an experiment that is relevant to such a model, 
Smokier and Shevrin (1979) administered selected Rorschach 
cards and several subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelli­
gence Scale to a group of subjects. Based on their test 
performance, subjects who tended toward the hysterical or 
the obsessive-compulsive extremes were administered a
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lateral eye movement questionnaire. The authors found that 
subjects who tended toward a hysterical extreme produced 
LEMs suggestive of right hemisphere involvement (i.e., were 
left lookers) while subjects who tended toward an obsessive- 
compulsive extreme produced LEMs suggestive of a basically 
left hemisphere involvement (i.e., were right lookers).
In another study that specifically addresses the rela­
tion between the obsessive-compulsive syndrome and the left 
hemisphere, Flor-Henry, Yeudall, Koles, and Howard (1979) 
utilized both neuropsychological tests and EEG recordings 
as indices of hemispheric activation. The authors found 
that patients with obsessive-compulsive syndrome demonstrated 
neuropsychological performance suggestive of left frontal 
dysfunction and EEG data reflective of perturbations (i.e., 
abnormalities of variability) in the left temporal and pari­
etal regions. They conclude that their results suggest that 
the syndrome is the product of a dysfunctional left frontal 
lobe that is no longer able to inhibit the verbal rumination 
from the posterior areas.
Assuming that certain occupations require individuals 
to have cognitive styles congruent with the particular de­
mands of that occupation, Galin and Ornstein (1974) and 
Doktor and Bloom (1977) have demonstrated lateralized EEG 
activity congruent with a model of hemispheric personality. 
Galin and Ornstein (1974) compared the eye movements of 
lawyers to ceramicists and later compared their respective
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EEGs (noted in Doktor and Bloom 1977). Essentially, Galin 
and Ornstein found that, while lawyers and ceramicists did 
not demonstrate significant group effects across the verbal 
and spatial tasks, the change in asymmetry was greater for 
lawyers than ceramicists, and this difference was due 
largely to the greater change in the left hemisphere leads 
(central, temporal, parietal) of the lawyers. This finding 
suggests that lawyers may have more facility in the use of 
their left hemispheres, the hemisphere whose cognitive ap­
proach is logical, verbal, and sequential; skills presumed 
to be more necessary in the practice of law than ceramics.
In an attempt to replicate Galin and Ornstein's find­
ings of lateralized cognitive styles, Doktor and Bloom (1977) 
compared the EEGs of eight highly placed executives, thought 
to be more intuitive thinkers, with the EEGs of six Opera­
tion Researchers, who are thought to be more analytical. 
Consistent with Galin and Ornstein's findings, Doktor and 
Bloom found that the Operation Researchers demonstrated a 
significant left hemisphere shift between the verbal- 
analytic tasks and the spatial-intuitive tasks. This dif­
ference was not demonstrated by the executive group. Al­
though no specific explanation is offered for lack of sig­
nificant inter-task shifts for the executives it is noted 
that half of the executives shifted in one direction while 
the other half shifted in an opposite direction.
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While the previous two studies of occupation and 
lateralized hemispheric activation show significant results, 
Dumas and Morgan's (1975) found no difference. Comparing 
artists and engineers,the.authors found that task effects 
were significant, whereas "the prediction that individuals 
may, through the course of experience, learn to rely more 
on one hemisphere than the other, was not supported." But 
as Furst (1976) points out in a review of Dumas and Morgan, 
many other variables may determine occupational choice in 
addition to cognitive predisposition and further within a 
given occupation a number of varying cognitive approaches 
can result in adequate performance. Hypothesizing individual 
differences, Furst compared the lateralized hemispheric ac­
tivation of the baseline EEG measure with task performance 
on a spatial task and found that baseline right hemispheric 
activation was significantly positively correlated with per­
formance. Furst (1976) concludes that the amount of later­
alized activation that an individual brings with him to the 
experiment is predictive of performance on a spatial task.
Noting the lack of uniformity of EEG data for later­
alized task effects expected from clinical and split brain 
studies, Gur and Reivich (1980) have also postulated that 
individual differences "may account significantly for varia­
tions in cognitive strategy and cognitive performance" (p. 
79). Using cerebral blood flow as an index of hemispheric 
activation the authors performed two experiments. In the
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first experiment they found that the left hemisphere demon­
strated greater activation during a verbal task but they 
did not find significantly more right hemisphere activation 
during the nonverbal task. The authors then correlated the 
performance measure for the spatial task with the lateral­
ity index. This correlation was significant, whereas the 
same correlation was not significant for the verbal task.
The authors interpreted this finding as suggesting that the 
"verbal task is more 'hardwired' to the left hemisphere, in­
creasing blood flow to the left relative to the right hemis­
phere . . . "  (pp. 86-7). The authors hypothesized further 
that the spatial task may be solvable by either the right or 
left hemisphere, although better performance was predicted 
by greater right hemispheric involvement. The authors con­
cluded that individual differences might therefore account 
for the lack of lateralized results for the spatial task.
In a second experiment, Gur and Reivich (1980) hy­
pothesized that if the differences in task-related later­
ality could be accounted for by individual differences, 
then the lateralized activation during the spatial task 
should predict an individual style measure such as lateral 
eye movements. After classifying individuals as right 
movers or left movers the authors found that left movers 
demonstrated significantly greater blood flow (i.e., activa­
tion) to the right hemisphere, whereas right movers demon­
strated a non-significant reversal. The authors conclude
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that individual differences may "exert significant influ­
ence on cognition and cognitive performance" (p. 89).
By viewing the hemispheres as being lateralized for 
certain types of thought and recognizing that an individual 
may choose which he will utilize, it becomes possible to 
understand the inconsistent realiability of cognitive task 
effect as well as to explain some of the apparent discrep­
ancies in the literature on emotion and uses of LEMs as an 
indicator of hemispheric activation. For cognitive tasks, 
if experimenters were not to control for individual differ­
ences, a study might sample left hemispheric thinkers such 
as students or laboratory workers (Gevins et al. 1979) and 
therefore not show comparative right hemispheric activation 
during spatial tasks.
In research on emotion, by comparing a right hemis­
pheric personality style (i.e., hysteric) to a left hemis­
pheric personality style (i.e., obsessive-compulsive), ex­
perimenters might incorrectly surmise that the left hemis­
phere is non-emotional. This misinterpretation might occur 
due to the left hemisphere's capability to modulate its 
level of affective expression via its superiority for de­
liberate activity, that is, its ability to differentiate 
experience into discrete units (words, digits, concepts, 
etc.) thereby allowing it to more effectively control and 
manipulate these units than if the emotion were experienced 
by a more "diffuse and passive awareness" (i.e., the right
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hemispheric personality style). In other words, the left 
hemisphere's more controlled emotional verbalization and 
expression may be minimized in comparison to the right hemis­
phere's diffuse emotional outbursts (Shapiro 1965). Results 
suggestive of the left hemisphere's control over affect can 
be found in articles by Shearer and Tucker (1981), Tucker 
and Newman (1981), and Galin (1974).
As well as suggesting that the right hemisphere is 
the locus for emotion or has relative superiority in the 
generation of affective expression, some experimenters 
might also mistakenly characterize the right hemisphere's 
emotional style as positive in comparison to a left hemis­
pheric negative emotional style (Harman & Ray 1977, Ehrlich- 
man & Weiner 1978). This misinterpretation might naturally 
occur as a result of the right hemispheric's hysteric­
like personality style which experiences emotion in a 
transitory fashion. Shapiro (1965), describing the hys­
teric's affect as immediate and unowned, states "hysterical 
people do regard their own emotional outbursts very much 
as they might regard conversion symptoms; that is, they do 
not quite regard the content of their outbursts as something 
they have really felt, but rather as something that has been 
visited on them or, as it were, something that has passed 
through them" (Shapiro 1965, p. 126). Therefore, negative 
affect, although immediately felt and intensely presented, 
may not be "owned" or admitted by the right hemispheric
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individual, whereas the left hemispheric individual's ten­
dency toward rumination and worry might easily lend itself 
to obsessing over negative affect.
This discussion of the hemisphere's differential cog­
nitive process as integral to differential handling of nega­
tive and positive affect might be useful in explaining Bear 
and Fedio's results (1977). Recalling that these authors 
found significant incongruity between observers' ratings of 
epileptic patients' displayed personality attributes and 
emotional expression with the patients' own ratings of this 
variable, it may be that the patients with right hemisphere 
epileptic foci subjectively rated themselves as less affec­
tively disturbed (i.e., more elation) since their negative 
affect was denied, while observers, noting the intensity of 
expression, would rate them as more affectively disturbed 
(i.e., more depressed). Similarly, epileptics with left 
hemisphere damage and exaggerated left hemisphere function­
ing, due to their more consciously ruminative style, would 
be more aware of and focused on their deficits and therefore 
feel more depressed than objective observers might rate 
the patients, since the observers would be seeing the more 
modulated affect of the left hemisphere.
In a recent study, Dawson, Tucker, and Swenson (in 
preparation) have shown results similar to the Bear and 
Fedio research in a study on normal college students. Us­
ing lateral eye movements and neuropsychological task
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performance as indices of hemispheric, activation, Dawson et 
al. showed that college students who reported feeling more 
depressed and anxious produced more right lateral eye move­
ments and performed better on left hemisphere cognitive 
tests than did college students who reported more denial, 
were repressive, and endorsed more socially desirable state­
ments. This latter group also appeared to produce more left 
lateral eye movements and performed better on right hemis­
pheric cognitive tasks.
The implication of this study is that there appears to 
be two general cognitive/affective matrices which describe 
the personality operations of the hemispheres. Expanding 
this model, it would be expected that if a person presented 
some elements from a given matrix, it would be likely that 
the person would demonstrate other elements of that matrix 
as well. In other words, if an individual demonstrates a 
facility with or propensity for, certain types of left 
hemisphere cognition such as sequential, analytical think­
ing, it might be expected that they would report matrix- 
consistent emotion, such as anxiety and depression, as well 
as left matrix-consistent personality traits, such as a 
tendency toward vigilance and self-criticism.
Because the research of Dawson et al. with normals 
parallels Bear and Fedio's (1977) findings with epileptics, 
it may be possible to consider relations between the 
disciplines of neurology, medical rehabilitation theory and
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psychology. Psychological theory may prove useful in treat­
ing brain injured patients, and rehabilitation techniques 
may be useful in treating psychiatric disorders. Further, 
it might be expected that certain neuropsychological testing 
deficits may appear as a function of psychiatric distur­
bances and not of neurological insult (Kronfol, Hamsher, 
Digre <i Waziri 1978). The neuropsychological deficits would 
remediate as the psychiatric condition improved.
While the Dawson et al. findings are encouraging in 
that they provide support for a lateralized personality 
model and hold implications for both medical and psychologi­
cal diagnosis/treatment, several methodological errors are 
evident. First, the factor analysis used had a high subject 
to variable ratio (circa 1:1), suggesting that the sample 
was overdescribed and therefore not generalizable. Second, 
tne index of hemispheric preference used in this study 
(LEMs) has recently been questioned by Ehrlichman and Wein­
berger (1978). After reviewing the literature on LEMs, 
Ehrlichman and Weinberger suggest that LEMs may be a result 
of social training, cultural bias, or some other factor, 
rather than a measure of hemispheric preference.
A final criticism of the Dawson et al. study has to 
do with the sample size and variance accounted for by the 
authors' findings. Dawson et al. correlated the personality 
factor with a percentage LEM measure on 25 college students. 
This resulted in a correlation of .35 and a near significant
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probability of .08. The small sample and the non-signifi­
cant correlation, describing only 12% of the sample, 
further limits the applicability of the findings to other 
populations. One possible reason for the small variance 
accounted for may be that the majority of the sample was 
able to flexibly utilize both hemispheres. As discussed 
earlier, it is expected that a number of individuals will 
demonstrate flexible usage of both hemispheres with only a 
slight tendency toward using one over the other. It may 
therefore be important to look at extreme groups in order to 
clearly investigate the validity of a hemispheric personal­
ity model.
Summary and Statement of the Problem
While there appears to be reliable evidence to suggest 
that the hemispheres are lateralized for cognition, emotion 
and personality traits, the direction of this lateraliza­
tion is not always clear. Building on the fairly consistent 
lateralized findings on cognition, it is possible to con­
struct a model of lateralized personality styles. This model 
can then serve to provide a heuristic framework with which 
to explain inconsistent and contradictory results appearing 
in the lateralization literature.
Although other authors have hypothesized the inter­
action between personality and hemispheric activity, no 
author to date has specifically hypothesized individual
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measures of personality tapping lateralized hemispheric pro­
cesses or how personality measures will interact with the de­
mands of a task. The purpose of this study is to further 
investigate the utility of a hemispheric personality model 
by using the Dawson, Tucker and Swenson personality factor 
to predict hemispheric activation during cognitive tasks.
Three specific hypotheses are explored in this study. 
First it is hypothesized that those individuals who have 
factor scores suggestive of analytical thinking, anxiety, 
hypervigilance, and self-criticism (critics) will demon­
strate overall left hemisphere activation regardless of task, 
while those individuals who have factor scores suggestive 
of Gestalt perception, denial, repression and lack of atten­
tion to detail (deniers) will demonstrate greater right 
hemispheric activation.
Second, it is hypothesized that these personality- 
related differences in hemispheric activation will be less 
evident during left hemisphere tasks (e.g., Word Fluency 
and character tasks) which may be "hardwired" (Gur & Reivich 
1980) and more evident during a baseline task (e.g., Relaxa­
tion) or a right hemisphere task (e.g., Shape task).
Finally, based on the work of Davidson, Schwartz,
Saron, Bennett, and Golman (1978) and Tucker, Stenslie,
Roth and Shearer (1981), it is hypothesized that critics 
will demonstrate greater right frontal lobe activity rela­
tive to left regardless of task. While Davidson et al.
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interpreted this finding as demonstrating a greater involve­
ment of the right hemisphere in negative affect, Tucker et 
al. have suggested that right frontal lobe activation in­
hibits right posterior activity. Tucker et al. postulate 
that depressive affect may be associated with a relatively 
active left posterior hemisphere, accompanied by an in­
hibited posterior right hemisphere.
Statistical analyses will proceed in five steps on 
two separate data sets (i.e., Power and Coherence). The 
first step will be to replicate the previously generated 
personality factor of Dawson, Tucker, and Swenson (in 
preparation). The second step will be to factor analyze 
the laterality-related personality self-description measures 
suggested by Dawson et al., for all EEG subjects. Each in­
dividual will then be given a factor score which will be 
used to differentiate subjects for the subsequent analyses.
Thirdly, in order to investigate the relationship be­
tween EEG power and personality, the continuous factor 
score variable will be used in a stepwise regression analy­
sis, across 4 bands (i.e., Delta, Theta, Alpha, Beta) with 
the exception that lower left hemisphere power and higher 
right hemisphere power will predict higher factor scores. 
This relationship will be clearest in the Alpha band and 
possibly replicated in the Theta band, whereas the effects 
might be reversed in the Beta 1 band (Schacter 1977). 
Although significant results may appear in these analyses,
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they are not expected to be large since it is assumed that 
most individuals are "flexible" in their hemispheric utili­
zation and therefore will not demonstrate a large hemis­
pheric preference.
In the fourth set of analyses, standardized factor 
score limits will be set at ± .75, thereby excluding 55% 
of the sample. The remaining 45% will be divided into two 
groups and then compared across all bands on power with 
the same expectations as the preceding set of analyses.
This set of analyses on disparate personality groups are 
expected to demonstrate the greatest personality effects 
as well as allow for the clear inspection of the interaction 
between personality and task demands.
Finally, comparisons between these two personality 
groups within a task across all bands on coherence data 
will be performed. Comparisons will be made on multiple, 
intra- and inter-coherence variables. Because research 
using coherence measures within tasks are exploratory at 
this time, no specific hypotheses are made and results will 




The purpose of this study was to investigate the 
replicability of a previously produced hemisphere related 
personality factor (Dawson, Tucker, Swenson, in prepara­
tion) and to relate this factor to another index of cerebral 
activation, electroencephalographic recordings. It was hy­
pothesized that, if the above personality factor was re­
lated to hemispheric activation, it would be possible to 
predict generalized hemisphere utilization on the basis of 
cognitive and personality variables. Specifically, it was 
expected that individuals who demonstrated relatively 
greater ability to perform spatial and Gestalt-like tasks 
and endorsed self-description items suggestive of repres­
sion, lower trait anxiety and a need to describe oneself 
in favorable terms, would demonstrate a relatively greater 
use of their right hemispheres than those individuals, who 
demonstrated better task performance on verbally or numeri­
cally mediated tasks and tasks requiring sequential or 
logical processing, as well as endorsing self-description 
items suggestive of self-criticism and less need to appear 
socially conforming. It was expected that the latter group
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♦would demonstrate relatively greater left hemisphere usage. 
Hemispheric activation was assumed to occur when power was 
relatively lower on one side than the other when EEG re­
cordings from the theta and alpha band were analyzed. Al­
though a recent study by Tucker, Dawson, and Roth (in prepa­
ration) suggests that both the delta and beta bands may dem­
onstrate task related differences, the literature on the re­
lationship between power in these bands and task effects is 
minimal. Therefore, investigations were made between person 
ality and task performance measures without specific hypothe 
ses in these bands. Coherence measures across all bands were 
investigated for personality effects without specific hy­
potheses .
Subjects
The subjects were 117 right-handed (by self-report) 
undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychol­
ogy course at the University of North Dakota. Forty of 
these subjects were solicited from a group of students who 
had previously volunteered to be practice testing subjects 
for UND graduate students of psychology. The graduate 
students had previously administered and scored three per­
sonality and one intelligence measures, the Minnesota Multi- 
phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), Rorschach, Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS), respectively. The tests were then reviewed
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and corrected for scoring accuracy by a graduate teaching
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assistant and finally by the professor, a clinical psycholo­
gist. Of these forty subjects, 23 were used in the Dawson 
et al. study and for some of the analyses reported here.
The remaining 17 subjects were used for all the analyses in 
this study.
The forty subjects were contacted by phone and re­
quested to participate in a study investigating the relation­
ship between brain waves and nutrition. They were offered 
an incentive of ten dollars to participate. The remaining 
67 subjects were solicited through a voluntary sign-up pro­
cedure and received five dollars and two hours of experimen­
tation credit for their participation.
Materials
For the 17 subjects not previously used in the Dawson, 
Tucker, and Swenson study, three different tests of person­
ality and an intelligence test had been administered before 
the subjects arrived for the experimental session. Of 
these tests only three were retained and of these three, 
specific subtests were chosen as being sensitive to the 
dichotomy being studied (i.e., critics versus deniers). 
Variables selected as being characteristic of critics in­
cluded the MMPI scales of D, Pk,F, and Sc and the WAIS 
verbal I.Q. and Arithmetic subtest. Variables thought to 
be more characteristic of deniers included the MMPI scales 
of Hy, Hs, K and L, the WAIS performance I.Q., and the 
WAIS subtests of Block Design and Object Assembly. Se­
lected Rorschach variables included the whole to detail
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ratio, egocentricity index, FC/CF + C, total color responses 
total achromatic responses, experience base and experience 
balance. Rorschach scores reflecting affective lability, 
uninhibitedness, Gestalt perception and impulsivity were 
thought to describe deniers, while scores reflecting con­
strained or depressive affect, anxiety, withdrawal, and de­
tail oriented perception were thought to describe critics.
All subjects received three pencil and paper person­
ality questionnaires which had previously proved sensitive 
to the dichotomy under study (Dawson, Tucker, and Swenson, 
in preparation). Included were a trait anxiety scale (Spiel 
berger 1968), a social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlow 
1960), and the controlled repression-sensitization scale 
(Orlofsky 1976; Handal 1973). Subjects also received a 
measure thought to assess an individual's ability to per­
ceive faces in a Gestalt processing fashion. This measure 
consisted of 24 Mooney faces (Mooney 1957) ranging from 
easy to difficult to perceive. The responses were scored 
for accuracy in perceiving the face's sex (male or female), 
age (child or adult) and direction the face was turned.
The number correct was divided by 24 and this percent cor­
rect was used in later analyses.
Neuropsychological Tasks
Besides completing the personality questionnaires, 
subjects were also administered tasks thought to draw upon 
the processing mode of specific sides of the brain while
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subjects' brain wave activity was recorded by an electro­
encephalograph. The tasks included one eyes-closed task, 
two eyes-open tasks, and one baseline task. The eyes- 
closed task was the word fluency task which required sub­
jects to mentally think of four words beginning and ending 
with two letters given. Once the subject had thought of 
four words or after twenty seconds the EEG recording was 
terminated and subjects were queried for their answers.
The two eyes-open tasks included two administrations 
of the character and the shape tasks. In order to give the 
subject practice in performing these tasks, both tasks were 
presented in their complete form, EEG recorded during the 
second presentation, and used in later analyses. For both 
these tasks a number of randomly generated characters and 
numerics were presented on a television screen in front of 
the subjects. After two presentations, the subjects were 
required to identify whether or not the two presentations 
were the same. In the character task the subjects were re­
quired to determine whether the two presentations contained 
the same numerics and characters regardless of the pattern 
they formed. The shape task, on the other hand, required 
the subject to ignore the specific characters and numerics 
in order to determine whether or not the shapes of the two 
presentations were the same. These tasks were counter­
balanced in presentation with the initial task selection 
randomized by the computer.
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The final EEG recording condition required subjects to 
relax and sit quietly with eyes closed (RELAX). This task 
was thought to reflect the subjects' general states of awake 
brain activity without specific task processing demands.
EEG Data Generation
In order to measure the electrical activity of the 
brain, gold cup electrodes were attached to each subject's 
scalp, according to the International Ten-Twenty System.
The specific sites of attachment were the left and right 
frontal areas (F3 and F4), temporal areas (T3 and T4), 
parietal areas (P3 and P4), and occipital areas (.01 and 02). 
The electrodes were referenced to bilateral inactive sites, 
linked earlobes (A1 and A2). All electrode impedances were 
below 10 K ohms.
EEG signals were transmitted by the electrodes to an 
amplifier. The signals were amplified at a 0.1 second cali­
brated time constant through a low noise, battery-powered, 
optically-isolated, A.C.-coupled amplifier. The signals 
were then filtered with 30 Hz, 3 dB, low pass filters.
Next the signals were digitized. Due to a system 
changeover that occurred halfway through data collection, 
part of the data were digitized differently. Data col­
lected in the first part of the study were submitted to an 
analog-digital conversion system with 10 bit resolution on 
two second epochs. The sampling rate for this group of
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data was 500 samples per channel per second. The samples 
were then digitally filtered down to 125 per second and 
finally conditioned with a split cosine bell on the first 
and last 12-1/2% of the sample to correct for sampling 
onset and termination.
After the system changeover, the new sampling rate 
became 256 samples per channel per second and these samples 
were digitally filtered down to 128 per second and condi­
tioned with a split cosine bell on the first and last 
12-1/2% of the sample.
After the samples were tapered, Fast Fourier Trans­
form was performed, and Fourier coefficients corresponding 
to power at each 1.0 Hz increment were produced. After 
each segment was transformed, cumulative auto- and cross- 
spectral densities were computed and scaled by the number 
of epochs.
Autospectral densities are computed by multiplying 
each complex Fourier coefficient by its conjugate. This 
process results in real numbers which are averaged across 
epochs and across specified spectra. The result is one 
number per channel per band which represents the average 
amplitude squared for that band for each channel. This 
number is referred to as average power.
Cross-spectral densities, on the other hand, are com­
puted by multiplying the complex Fourier coefficients of
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one channel with the complex conjugate of another. The re­
sult is a complex number which represents the covariance 
between the two channels. These covariances are also aver­
aged across epochs and spectra. Since there are eight 
channels, 28 cross-spectra are produced (IN*(N-1) * 2]).
After cumulative cross- and auto-spectral densities 
were computed, coherences were computed. Coherence is com­
puted by taking the complex absolute value of the cross­
spectrum of two channels, squaring the result, and then di­
viding by the product of the powers of the two channels.
The result is a standardized covariance between two channels 
and is closely analogous to correlation. For.a further 
discussion of the computation and considerations of power, 
cross-spectral density, and coherence, see Tucker, Roth, 
and Bair (in preparation). The bandwidths for the spectra 
used to compute power, cross-spectral densities, and co­
herence were 0.5 Hz - 3.5 Hz (delta), 4.0 - 7.0 Hz (theta), 
7.5 - 12.5 Hz (alpha), and 13.0 - 18.0 Hz (beta). After 
the average powers and coherences per task per band were 
computed the indices were copied onto magnetic tape and 
stored for later analyses.
Procedure
Subjects were contacted by telephone by an under-1 
graduate assistant who solicited their participation and 
scheduled them for two appointments. The first appointment
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was for a blood draw of 5 cc which was used in another exper 
raent. The second appointment was scheduled within two days 
of the first. When subjects arrived for the second appoint­
ment, they were met at the door by a registered nurse. The 
nurse escorted the subjects to an examination room where 
they filled out the Spielberger (1968) trait anxiety scale, 
the social-desirability scale, the controlled repression- 
sensitization scale, and the Mooney Faces form. Gold cup, 
scalp electrodes were attached to the subjects' heads.
Next, the subjects were escorted by a nurse to a separ 
ate room for administration of the neuropsychological tasks 
and collection of EEG activity. The subjects were placed in 
a comfortable chair inside an electrically-shielded, acousti 
cally-controlled booth. The subjects faced a television 
screen which was used for some of the tasks; otherwise the 
booth was unlit. Once the subjects were comfortable and 
fully instructed as to strategies to reduce EEG artifact 
(i.e., don't swallow, try not to move your eyes, relax the 
muscles of your jaw and scalp, etc.), the nurse shut the 
door to the booth. When subjects began to demonstrate 
fairly artifact-free EEG waves, the nurse administered 
the neuropsychological test battery and recorded the sub­
ject's brain waves as they processed or performed the tasks. 
After all the data were collected the subjects were de­
briefed and given their recompense.
These data and demographic information were pooled 
and recorded onto coding sheets by an undergraduate
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assistant and the experimenter. The sheets were key-punched 
onto cards and used in later analyses.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses proceeded in three stages. In 
the first stage of analyses, an attempt was made to repli­
cate the previously reported hemispherically-related per­
sonality factor (Dawson, Tucker, and Swenson, in prepara­
tion). In a similar procedure, data from all those subjects 
for whom the various personality and neuropsychological data 
had been collected were first subjected to a partial corre­
lation procedure to remove the effects of sex. The result­
ing partial correlation matrix was then factor-analyzed 
using ones on the diagonal. A principal axis extraction 
was performed, the number of factors required to account for 
about 70% of the variance were retained, and the retained 
factors were subjected to oblique rotation. The factors 
were then described.
Next, the three self-description questionnaires sug­
gested by Dawson, Tucker and Swenson as being sensitive to 
lateralized personality, were factor analyzed for all sub­
jects. Using principal axis extraction and ones on the 
diagonal, one factor was generated and then used to produce 
a factor score for all subjects that had power data.
In the second stage of analyses average power was 
used to predict subjects' personality factor scores.
Under the hypothesis that certain personality types tend
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to utilize one hemisphere more than the other, regardless 
of task demands, it was expected that those subjects who 
tended to be deniers would show larger regression coeffici­
ents on right EEG channels (F4, T4, P4 and 02) than critics, 
while the latter group would grow greater coefficients on 
the left EEG channels (F3, T3, P3 and 01). Stepwise multiple 
regressions of EEG average power on personality were done 
for each of the four bands for each neuropsychological task. 
In order not to overdescribe the results, only regressions 
that demonstrated a probability of .1 or less and/or up to 
a four variable solution were described.
While the above set of analyses might reveal general 
differences in EEG power fluctuations, it was thought that 
normals in the middle range (i.e., +/- .75 standard devia­
tion accounting for 55% of the sample) were more likely 
mixed in their hemispheric utilization and that individu­
als who produced personality factor scores greater than 
+/- .75 standard deviation might more clearly demonstrate 
hemisphereic preferences. In order to address this con­
cern, a third set of analyses were performed, using the 
Bonferrone t and paired student t tests of coherence on 
two extreme groups.
Only subjects who had factor scores greater or less 
than .75 and had EEG data based on at least one second 
epochs of data for both tasks under consideration, were 
used for the contrasts. Because the two personality groups
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had an unequal number of observations and the design involved
repeated measures, the Bonferroni t statistic was selected
as the best contrast test (Meyers 1979) for the power data.
The Bonferroni t [t = Y. - Y_ f MS (— + — )] was1 2 error n^ n2
appropriate for this particular design because it controls 
the per experiment error rate (PEER) by setting lower per 
comparison error rates (PCER) based on the number of selected 
pairwise mean comparisons that are made (PEER/k = PCER).
The first step in this set of analyses was to code 
those individuals who had factor scores greater than .75 
as deniers and those who had factor scores less than .75 
as critics. Next a mean squares error term was generated 
for each of the three specific hypotheses for each band 
within sets of tasks. One set of tasks included the eyes- 
closed verbal task (i.e., Word Fluency) and the eyes-closed 
baseline task (i.e., Relaxation). The other set of tasks 
were eyes-open numeric-letter processing task (i.e., Char­
acter) and spatial task (i.e., Shape). Tasks were grouped 
in this fashion to control for power variance directly at­
tributable to whether or not the eyes are open and to allow 
the comparison of left hemisphere cognitive tasks with a 
right hemisphere one. These groupings also allowed the 
direct investigation of whether or not personality later­
alization would be more evident during a certain type of 
cognitive task (i.e., left or right).
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To explore the hypothesis that personality types 
utilize their hemispheres differently regardless of task, 
four mean comparisons were made; two comparing hemispheric 
means within a personality type and two comparing congruent 
hemispheres across personality. Setting the PEER at .05 
then required the PCER to be set at .0125. The second hy­
pothesis that personality differences will be more evident 
in right hemispheric or baseline tasks was examined by mak­
ing eight pairwise comparisons; four comparing hemispheric 
means within personality type and task and four comparing 
congruent hemispheric means across personality types within 
a task. Setting the PEER at .05 then required the PCER 
to be .00625.
The third hypothesis that critics would show para­
doxical effects by demonstrating right frontal lobe activa­
tion, regardless of task, was investigated by making four 
comparisons; two comparisons of lateralized frontal lobe 
means within a personality type and two congruent later­
alized frontal lobe mean comparisons across personality 
types. Setting the PEER at .05 required the PCER to be 
set at .0125.
Thus far, all of the analyses were performed on aver­
age power as an index of cortical activation. However, 
there are current hypotheses suggesting that merely in­
vestigating the power at a given site ignores information 
available through relationships between and/or among sites
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(Tucker, Roth, & Bair, in preparation). Tucker et al. have 
suggested that coherence may provide one measure which re­
flects the amount of shared variance between two sites. 
However, while investigating the relationships between 
sites by coherence may provide valuable information, it 
is clear that the number of possible combinations to 
review increases geometrically with the addition of each 
site.
Since coherence might be considered as statistically 
comparable to correlation, in order to characterize this mul­
titude of information Tucker et al. have suggested that 
operations performed on correlations could also be used 
with coherence. One possible way to reduce coherence infor­
mation is to compute three multiple coherence measures as 
suggested by Tucker, Roth and Bair (in preparation). They 
were a multiple coherence number (between each channel and 
all others), an intrahemispheric partial multiple coherence 
number (between each channel and all other ipsilateral 
channels with the effects of the contralateral channels 
partialed out) and an interhemispheric partial multiple co­
herence number (between each channel and all contralateral 
channels with the effects of ipsilateral channels partialed 
out) .
Multiples, intrahemispheric partial multiples (IAPM) 
and interhemispheric partial multiples (IRPMs) were com­
puted for all eight leads within a personality type (i.e.,
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personality factor score less than or greater than .75). 
Paired comparison t tests were used to compare congruent 
channels within a form of coherence within a band across 
personality types within each of two tasks, Relaxation and 
Word Fluency. Paired comparison t tests were also used to 
explore lateralized coherence differences within a person­
ality style. Only within lobe lateralized comparisons' were 
made in this last exploration of the data.
Multiple coherence measures were computed using matrix 
operations on data from each subject within a frequency 
band for a personality type. The coherences were then 
z-transformed and averaged across all subjects to give one 
mean matrix per band for a personality type. Analyses 
were performed and all results from coherence data were 
then described without reference to any specific hypotheses.
RESULTS
Demographic Data
Analysis of the data of 117 subjects revealed that 
the average age was 19.87, ranging from 17 to 34 (S.D. =
2.95). There were 28 males and 89 females. All subjects 
were self-reported righthanders. Because data were lost 
through computer error, editing, or attrition, and because 
only extreme scores were used in the group comparisons, 
groups within data sets had unequal numbers of observations. 
Adjustments were made where appropriate and the number of 
observations was reported. However, the loss in data was 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that each subject's power 
value was averaged across a number of observations, thereby 
making the power value more stable. A single observation 
for a subject consisisted of data collected from an average 
of 33 one second time intervals.
Factor Analysis
In an attempt to replicate Dawson et al.'s lateralized 
factor pattern, 17 subjects were administered all measures 
used in that study except for the MMPI scale Pd, the Rorschach 
index of A%, and the Embedded Figures task. These indices 
were eliminated from the present factor analyses because they 
did not prove to load significantly in the factor in the
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Dawson et al. study, they are not easily interpretable in 
terms of the dichotomy presently under study, and their ex­
clusion reduced the variable to subject ratio.
Sex was partialed out of the data and the residual 
matrix was subjected to principal axis extraction. Six 
factors accounting for 70% of the total variance were re­
tained and obliquely rotated. The largest factor, the sum 
of squared factor loadings being equal to 5.0, had 11 vari­
ables greater than 3.0. Of the six variables with loadings 
greater than .40 in the Dawson, Tucker and Swenson study, 
four were replicated in this study (see Table 1). Other 
variables with factor loadings greater than .4 in this 
study were the Rorschach variables of total color responses 
(-.45663) and zd (-.42742) and the MMPI variables of D 
(.75831), Pt (.45012) and F (.49748).
Although the majority of the variables in the Dawson 
et al. personality factor were replicated in this study, it 
should be noted that two of the six variables of that fac­
tor were not replicated at a .4 factor loading or above.
One of these variables was the K scale variable of the MMPI. 
While the K scale variable in this replication demonstrated 
a factor loading of -.26622, the direction of this loading 
was consistent with the K scale variable loading of the 
previous study.
The second variable which did not replicate in the 
degree or direction of the Dawson et al. personality factor
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Table 1
Factor Structure of Variables With 


















was the Rorschach WD ratio variable. This study's WD ratio 
= .27956. While this finding is especially disconcerting 
because of the loading direction reversal, this variable may 
be sensitive to fluctuations in intellectual abilities rather 
than an index of stable perceptual style (Exner 1978). The 
relationship between Whole responses and intellect is par­
ticularly evident in the case where the whole response cod­
ing is the result of perceiving two or more detail areas in 
meaningful relationship.
Essentially, the personality factor in this study 
replicated the personality factor found by Dawson, Tucker and 
Swenson and described the hypothesized lateralized hemis­
pheric personality style. This factor described a pattern 
which suggested lack of denial (-ML, REPS), non-endorsement 
of socially desirable self-statements (-SDS), anxiety/ 
sensitivity (F, Pt, TANX) and depression (D). The only 
cognitive measure which nad a loading near .4 was memory 
for digits forward and backward (.36065), suggesting that 
the personality traits described above were associated with 
numeric memory. Inverted, the factor described a pattern 
suggestive of denial, repression, endorsing socially desir­
able self-statements, denial or anxiety and depression, and 
poor memory for digits.
Stepwise Multiple Regressions on Power
Using the three replicated paper and pencil self­
description measures (REPS, TANX and SDS), a second factor
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analysis was performed on all subjects who completed all 
three forms, including the 40 subjects previously reported 
in the Dawson et al. study (n = 23) and the new subjects of 
this replication (n = 17), in order to describe an overall 
factor pattern for these three variables with which to score 
individuals for analyses to follow. Only the first princi­
pal axis extraction factor was retained (n = 95) and this 
factor replicated the general relationship discussed in Daw­
son et al. (see Table 2).
After factor scoring all subjects, stepwise multiple
. 2regression analyses increasing the R with each variable, 
were performed. All eight channels of average power were 
used to predict the factor score of each individual within 
each task with stepwise multiple regressions (MAX R). In 
order to best characterize the findings within tasks and bands, 
the highest significant (p < .1) regressions using four or 
less variables were reported. If no regression demonstrated 
significance, then the regression with a probability closest
to .1 and having four or less variables was reported. The
2 2 R , the probability of the R , the direction of the co­
efficient and the probability of each variable were reported 
(see Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6). The tables report the prob­
ability for each channel (frontals: left = F3, right = F4; 
temporals: left = T3, right = T4; parietals: left = P3,
right = P4; and occipitals: left = 01, right = 02) followed 
by the direction of the b value in parentheses.
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Table 2
Principal Axis Extracted Factor of Selected 
Personality Variables
Variables
Factor Loadings of Combined 





Stepwise Regressions for All Bands of Word Fluency (n = 70)
F3 F4 T3
Channels 
T4 P3 P4 01 02 R2 P =
Delta prob = . 26 (- ) .08(+) .04(+) • 09 ( + ) .124 . 060
Theta prob = .05 (-) .06(+) .063 .107
Alpha prob = H* 00 +* .026 .179
Beta 1 prob = .08 (-) . 02 ( + ) .02(+) .09 (-) .147 .029
Note. Values reported for each channel are b coefficients followed by the sign of
their direction in parentheses.
4^
Table 4
Stepwise Regressions for All Bands of Relaxation (n = 46)
F3 F4 T3
Channels 
T4 P3 P4 01 02 R2 P =
Delta prob = .26(+) .05 (-) .15 (-) .01(+) .225 .024
Theta prob = .26(+) • 05 (-) .38 (-) .03(+) .201 . 042
Alpha prob = • 06 (-) .13 ( + ) . 077 .163
Beta 1 prob = .46 (-) .23 (-) .01( + ) .48 (+) .164 .096
i_n
Note. Values reported for each channel are b coefficients followed by the sign of
their direction in parentheses.
Table 5
Stepwise Regressions for All Bands of Character (n = 40)
F3 F4 T3 T4
Channels
P3 P4 01 02 R2 P =
Delta prob = • 04 (-) • 07( + ) .010 .129
Theta prob = .32(+) -18 (-) .29 (-) •21(+) .196 .082
Alpha prob = • 12 (-) .21 ( + ) .063 .282
Beta 1 prob = .02(-) .02(+) .03(+) .02(-) .271 .017
Note. Values reported for each channel are b coefficients, followed by the sign of
their direction in parentheses.
Table 6
Stepwise Regressions for All Bands of Shape (n = 41)
F3 F4 T3
Channels 
T4 P3 P4 01 02 R2 P =
Delta prob = •17(+) .10 (-) .072 ,224
Theta prob = .31 ( + ) .41 (-) .01 (-) .09)+)
Alpha prob = • 07( + ) .02 (-) .13(+) .151 .092
Beta 1 prob = .22 (-) • 07( + ) .05 ( + ) .28 (-) .197 . 073 ~-j
Note. Values reported for each channel are b coefficients, followed by the sign of
their direction in parentheses.
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The most consistent results within a band across tasks 
were found in the alpha band and suggested the deniers were 
associated with right temporal lobe activation and the 
critics were associated with deactivation of the right tem­
poral lobe (see Table 7). Results in the theta band sug­
gested that critics were associated with right frontal lobe 
and left temporal lobe activation, and left frontal lobe de­
activation, while deniers were associated with just the 
opposite. Although not as clearly interpretable, the delta 
band demonstrated that increasing right frontal and decreas­
ing left temporal powers were associated with higher critics' 
scores, while only decreasing right occipital lobe power 
was consistently associated with critics' scores in the 
beta band (see Table 7).
Bonferroni t Tests on Power
While the regressions generally suggested that critics 
were associated with greater left hemispheric activation and 
deniers with right hemispheric activation, paradoxical ef­
fects were noted in the frontal leads in the theta band. 
Although these findings were consistent across all tasks, 
the variance for reported regressions ranged from 3% to 21% 
and not all of the leads were individually significant con­
tributors. Assuming that individuals with more extreme 
factor scores would demonstrate clearer results than com­
parisons made against a continuous variable, those individuals 
demonstrating factor scores greater than .75 were labeled
Table 7
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Across 
Tasks and Within Bands
Frequency 
3 orBand Channel (Frequency) Greater
Delta -F3(1), +F4 (3), -T3 (3) , +P3(1) , -01(2), +02(2) +F4 , -T3
Theta +F3 (3) , -F4(3), -T3(4), +P3(3), +01(1) +F3, -F4 ,
-T3, +P4
Alpha +F3 (1) , -F3 (1) , -F4(1) , -T3(1), +T4 (3) , +P3 (1) +T4
Beta 1 -F3 (2) , -F4 (2), +T4(2) , +P3(1), -P3 (1) , +P4 (2) , +01(2), -02(3) -02
Note, The sign (+ or -) represents the direction of the b coefficient.
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critics and those with scores below -.75 were labeled de- 
niers.
Using personality as a classification variable, spec­
ific hypotheses were investigated in the average power data 
set. In order to investigate the three specific hypotheses 
of this study, tasks were combined into two sets based on 
whether or not the subjects' eyes were open during the task. 
The same comparisons were performed on each band for each 
set of tasks. The results of these comparisons were reported 
for each set of tasks per hypothesis across all bands with 
particular emphases on the more easily interpretable theta 
and alpha bands. A summary across sets of tasks was then 
made.
Eyes Closed Tasks
For all of the following analyses on the eyes closed 
tasks there were 23 subjects. Nine were critics and all 
were right handed females with a mean age of 20.78 (S.D. =
5.4). Of the remaining 14 deniers, 3 were male and 11 were 
female. All deniers were right handed and had a mean age 
of 20.79 (S.D. = 3.0).
Hypothesis I. In order to investigate the hypothesis 
that each personality type utilized their hemispheres dif­
ferentially, regardless of task, the PEER was set at .05 
for four contrasts and dferrQr = 21, thereby requiring that 
a comparison demonstrate an absolute t of 2.831 or better
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to be significant. Comparisons across personality types 
(i.e., hemisphere congruent comparison: critics' left 
hemispheres with the deniers' left hemispheres and critics' 
rights with deniers' rights), revealed significant results 
for only the alpha band.
Comparisons within the alpha band demonstrated two 
significant contrasts. The first significant contrast re­
vealed that the deniers had more active right hemispheres 
than did the critics (t = 2.963), while the left hemis­
pheres of deniers were not significantly different from 
critics.' . Significantly greater right than left hemispheric 
activation was also noted with deniers (t = 4.133), whereas 
critics did not show any lateralization within a personality 
type (see Table 8). These results suggested that deniers 
used their right hemispheres more than critics, regardless 
of task. Further, although not significant, the critics 
demonstrated a reversal of lateralized activity, compared 
to deniers (see Table 8).
Hypothesis II. The second hypothesis was that both 
personality types would demonstrate greater lateralization 
effects during a spatial task or baseline period than dur­
ing a left hemisphere task. Eight comparisons were made, 
four lateralized comparisons (within each task within each 
personality type) and four hemisphere congruent comparisons 
(comparing congruent hemispheres within each task across 
each personality type). Since the t table did not list an
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Table 8
Personality by Hemispheric Comparison 
in Alpha for Average Power
For Word Fluency and Relaxation*
Critics Deniers
Left Right Left Right
Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere
3.96 4.00 4.38 3.20
*These means and all that follow were log.Q transformed 
for the analysis and were transformed into average power for these tables (lOlogio mean) .
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exact t value for a PEER of .00625, the next highest t for 
df =21 was used, making the test more conservative.
The next highest t resulted in a PEER of .008.
For this personality by hemisphere by task investiga­
tion, significant differences were discovered in both the 
theta and alpha bands. In the alpha band, the results es­
sentially replicated the findings of the hemisphere by per­
sonality comparisons, but only for the Relaxation task (see 
Table 9). Within the Relaxation task deniers used their 
right hemispheres significantly more than the left (t = 
13.260) and used the right hemisphere significantly more 
than did critics (t = 12.490).
Comparisons within the theta bands duplicated those 
of the alpha band for both lateralized comparisons (t = 
4.597) and hemisphere congruent comparisons (t = 8.015) dur­
ing the Relaxation task. Beyond these results, the theta 
band comparisons also demonstrated differences during the 
Word Fluency Task. During this task, deniers demonstrated 
lower right hemisphere average power (t = 3.964) while 
critics demonstrated relative symmetry (see Table 10). 
Hemisphere congruent comparisons within Word Fluency and 
across personality types revealed lower average power in 
the left hemisphere of critics relative to deniers (t = 
5.214).
The results from the alpha and theta bands suggested 
that personality did interact with the type of task.
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Table 9
Personality by Hemisphere and Task Comparisons 
in Alpha for Average Power
For Word Fluency and Relaxation 
Critics Deniers





2.72 2.67 3.07 3.13
Relaxation Relaxation
Left
Hemisphere RightHemisphere LeftHemisphere RightHemisphere
5.78 6.01 6.24 3.19
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Table 10
Personality by Hemisphere and Task Comparisons in Theta for Average Power
For Word Fluency and Relaxation
Critics Deniers
Word Fluency Word Fluency
Left Right Left RightHemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere
2.58 2.56 3.01 2.68
Relaxation Relaxation
Left Right Left RightHemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere
3.15 4.00 3.07 2.69
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Deniers demonstrated greater right hemisphere activation 
in both tasks for theta and in Relaxation for alpha. Com­
parisons in both bands demonstrated that deniers have lower 
average power (i.e., higher activation) in the right hemis­
phere during Relaxation than critics. In theta critics 
demonstrated greater activation in the left hemisphere 
relative to deniers during Word Fluency. These results sug­
gest that personality interacted with task and that person­
ality effects may be more distinguishable in the theta band 
than in the alpha band. Further it appeared that right/ 
left hemispheric asymmetry effects were more apparent dur­
ing Relaxation. Although this difference was not signifi­
cant for critics (t = 2.603 in theta, t = .815 in alpha), 
the direction of their asymmetry was consistent with a hemis­
pheric personality model.
Hypothesis III. The third hypothesis was that a para­
doxical effect would occur in the frontal lobes of critics. 
Specifically, it was expected that critics would demonstrate 
greater activation in the right frontal lobe relative to 
the left, regardless of task. Further, it was predicted 
that critics would have lower average power in the right 
frontal lobe than would deniers.
Because four comparisons were made and the PEER was 
set at .05, a comparison needed to produce a probability 
equal to or less than .0125. With df error = 63 the t 
needed to be greater than or equal to 2.660 to be considered
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significant. Comparisons within and between personality 
types in the frontal lobes revealed significant results in 
both the theta and alpha bands (see Table 11). In the alpha 
band significant comparisons demonstrated that both the 
left and right frontal lobes of critics had significantly 
less average power than deniers (t = 3.211 for left frontal 
lobes and t = 4.568 for right). No within personality type 
differences were noted.
The only significant comparison (see Table 12) within 
the theta band revealed that the left frontal lobe of critics 
evidenced less average power than that of deniers (t = 3.799). 
This finding and those in the alpha band suggested that 
critics had less average power in their frontal lobes than 
did deniers and that this difference was only exhibited in 
the left frontal lobe for the theta data. These findings 
were in contradiction to the third hypothesis.
Assuming that the frontal lobes might have been overly 
sensitive to task demands, a post hoc set of comparisons 
were performed on the eyes closed baseline task, Relaxation. 
The findings of this set of contrasts duplicated the previ­
ously reported findings, with one additional finding in 
theta. This finding suggested that, during the Relaxation 
task, deniers' right frontal lobes demonstrated signifi­
cantly (t = 3.971) less average power than their left 
frontal lobes. This latter finding was in direct opposition 
to Hypothesis III (see Table 13).
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Table 11
Personality by Lateral Frontal Lobe Mean Comparisons 
in Alpha for Average Power
Across Word Fluency and Relaxation
Critics Deniers
Left Right Left RightFrontal Frontal Frontal Frontal
2.88 2.76 3.87 3.65
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Table 12
Personality by Lateral Frontal Lobe Mean Comparisons 
in Theta for Average Power
Across Word Fluency and Relaxation
Critics Deniers
Left Right Left Right
Frontal Frontal Frontal Frontal
3.56 3.63 4.61 3.97
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Table 13
Personality by Lateral Frontal Lobe Mean Comparisons 




Left Right Left Right
Frontal Frontal Frontal Frontal
3.81 3.91 4.20 3.64
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Summary. The selected pairwise mean comparisons per­
formed on Word Fluency and Relaxation for each of the four 
frequency bands (i.e., delta, theta, alpha, beta) revealed 
several significant findings. One of the most interesting 
findings was that only the theta and alpha bands demonstrated 
personality effects, and these effects appeared to be more 
apparent in the theta band. In terms of the hypotheses, it 
was found that the personality types demonstrated characteris­
tic laterality effects, suggesting that deniers utilize 
their right hemispheres more than their lefts and more than 
critics used their right hemispheres. Further, it was 
found that these differences were more evident in the Re­
laxation task than the Word Fluency task, although some 
task and personality interactions were seen during the Word 
Fluency task in the theta band. Most of these reported 
differences were basically due to significantly lower aver­
age power in the right hemisphere of deniers, although a 
non-significant, hypothesis-consistent, reversal was noted 
for critics. There were no findings to support a notion 
of paradoxical frontal lobe activation. Instead the find­
ings paralleled hemispheric comparisons, that is, greater 
right frontal lobe activity was noted for deniers.
Eyes Open Tasks
For all of the following analyses on the eyes open 
tasks there were 30 subjects. Nine were critics, and all were
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right handed females with a mean age of 21 (S.D. = 5.36). 
Eight had been included in the previously reported eyes 
closed analyses. Of the 21 deniers, 4 were males and 17 
were females, and all were right handed. Thirteen of the 
22 deniers were included in the eyes closed analyses and of 
these 13, 3 were male.
Hypothesis I. The first hypothesis, that each person­
ality type would utilize their hemispheres differentially, 
was investigated. With the PEER set at .05, df error = 28, 
and four comparisons, significant results (t = 2.763) were 
found in only the theta and alpha bands. In the alpha band 
only the hemisphere consistent comparisons across personality 
type demonstrated significant results (see Table 14). The 
results showed that critics had less average power in both 
hemispheres than did deniers (t = 3.375 for the left hemis­
pheres and a t = 2.945 for the right ones). No asymmetrical 
differences within each personality type were noted, al­
though deniers demonstrated a slight trend toward lower 
average power in the right hemisphere (t = .464).
In the theta band the only significant (t = 4.958) 
comparison demonstrated that critics had lower average power 
in their left hemispheres than deniers (see Table 15). Al­
though non-significant, two other comparisons were worthy 
of note. First, right hemisphere comparisons showed a 
strong tendency (t = 2.667) toward lower average power for 
critics compared to deniers. While this essentially
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Table 14
Personality by Hemisphere Comparisons 
in Alpha for Average Power
For Character and Shape
Critics Deniers
Left Right Left Right
Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere
1.55 1.55 1.86 1.82
84
Table 15
Personality by Hemisphere Comparisons 
in Theta for Average Power
For Character and Shape
Critics Deniers
Left Right Left Right
Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere
2.22 2.19 2.77 2.47
85
replicated the findings in alpha, the slight tendency toward 
lower average power in the right hemisphere for deniers was 
more strongly demonstrated (t = 2.523). Overall, the theta 
band replicated the findings of the alpha band with the 
further indication that deniers have lower average power in 
the right hemisphere.
Hypothesis II. The second hypothesis, that both per­
sonality types would demonstrate greater lateralization dur­
ing a spatial task, was investigated. Since no precise t 
for a PCER of .00625 and df error = 28 was available the 
next smallest tabled t probability (p < .001) was used, 
thereby resulting in a PEER of a more conservative .008.
To be significant a t value would have had to have been equal 
to or greater than 3.674. Investigations revealed signifi­
cant contrasts for all bands. Results within the delta and 
beta 1 bands were noted without assumptions regarding ac­
tivation.
Significant comparisons within the alpha band for 
Hypothesis II duplicated those findings in the alpha band 
under Hypothesis I. That is, in both the Character and Shape 
tasks critics evidenced less average power than deniers 
(Character; left t = 4.549, right t = 4.785; Shape; left t = 
7.126, right t=5.536). No asymmetrical differences within 
personality types were noted (see Table 16).
Unlike the alpha band, comparisons within the theta 
not only replicated the findings under Hypothesis I
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Table 16
Personality by Hemisphere and Task Mean Comparisons 
in Alpha for Average Power
Critics






1.62 1.56 1.86 1.81
Shape Shape
Left
Hemisphere RightHemisphere LeftHemisphere RightHemisphere
1.49 1.54 1.86 1.83
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(Character: left t = 12.810, right t = 9.022; Shape: left
t = 14.382, right t = 5.725), but also demonstrated less 
average power in the right hemisphere for deniers (see Table 
17) for both the Character (t = 7.142) and Shape (t = 6.567) 
tasks. Results in both theta and alpha indicated that the 
Character task was associated with less average power in 
both hemispheres and, at least in theta, that deniers evi­
denced lower average power in their right hemispheres rela­
tive to their lefts.
Comparisons within the delta band revealed that critics 
had lower average power than deniers for the Shape task 
(left t = 5.771, right t = 4.642). Critics also had lower 
power in the right hemisphere during the Shape task than 
deniers (t = 4.187). Unlike any other band, significant 
contrasts in the beta 1 band demonstrated less average power 
in the right hemisphere than the left within both person­
ality types for the Shape task (critics' t = 4.281, deniers' 
t = 3.798) and for critics in the Character task (t =
5.287). This last difference was nearly significant (t = 
3.008) for deniers during the Character task with greater 
left hemisphere average power (see Table 18).
Hypothesis III. The third hypothesis, that a para­
doxical lateralization would occur in the frontal lobes, 
was investigated. There was no precise t value for a PCER
of .01 and df = 84 therefore a more conservative terror
value (i.e., using a df of 60) was selected, that is, ^ error
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Table 17
Personality by Hemisphere and Task Mean Comparisons in Theta for Average Power
Critics
For Character and Shape
Deniers
Character Character
LeftHemisphere RightHemisphere LeftHemisphere RightHemisphere










2.20 2.28 2.79 2.51
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Table 18
Personality by Hemisphere and Task Mean Comparisons, 







5.34 5.00 5.74 5.61
Shape Shape
Left Right Left RightHemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere




Left Right Left Right
Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere
. 863 . 763 . 826 . 770
Shape Shape
Left Right Left RightHemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere Hemisphere
. 879 . 795 . 839 .768
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a t of 2.660 or greater was needed to be significant. Sig­
nificant contrasts comparing the frontal lobe activities of 
critics and deniers were evidenced in only the alpha and 
theta bands. In alpha (see Table 19) critics demonstrated 
significantly greater left frontal lobe activation than 
deniers (t = 3.042). This finding was also evidenced (t = 
3.330) in the theta band (see Table 20).
Summary. The selected pairwise comparisons performed 
on the Character and Shape tasks for each of the four fre­
quency bands (i.e., delta, theta, alpha and beta 1) revealed 
several significant results. Once again most of the sig­
nificant effects for personality types were evidenced in 
the alpha and theta bands, and only in the theta band was 
a within personality type asymmetrical difference signifi­
cant.
In terms of the hypotheses, it was demonstrated that 
the Character task involved overall greater activation of 
both hemispheres of critics than deniers. This finding is 
similar to the findings of Tucker, Dawson, and Roth (in 
preparation) that verbal (left hemisphere) tasks involve 
more overall activation of both hemispheres and suggests 
that critics use their hemispheres in a way consistent with 
the demands of verbal tasks. Further, critics appear to 
utilize their left hemispheres more than deniers and de­
niers utilize their right hemispheres more than their 
lefts, regardless of task, whereas critics were symmetrical
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Table 19
Personality by Hemisphere Mean Comparisons in Alpha for Average Power










1.47 1.42 1.88 1.74
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Table 20
Personality by Hemisphere Mean Comparisons 
in Theta for Average Power










2.93 2.97 3.69 3.47
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in their hemispheric activation. No paradoxical frontal 
lobe effects were noticed.
Summary of Paired Comparisons on Power
In summary, the analyses on average power for both the 
eyes open and eyes closed tasks presented several consistent 
findings. First, personality effects were seen in both 
task sets primarily in the theta and alpha bands, with the 
most interpretable results in the former. Overall, it ap­
peared that laterality effects occurred within and between 
personality types. Deniers used their right hemispheres 
more than critics and critics used their left hemispheres 
more than deniers. Although critics demonstrated only a 
tendency for their left hemispheres to show greater activa­
tion than their rights, a significant laterality effect 
was demonstrated for deniers with their right hemispheres 
showing relatively greater activation than their lefts.
Further, it should be noted that lateralized person­
ality effects were demonstrated more clearly for the eyes 
closed tasks than for the eyes open tasks. One reason for 
such a difference may have been the physiological implica­
tions of having the eyes open or closed. Goodman, Beatty, 
and Mulholland (1980) have shown that open eyed tasks 
have less power to begin with and may therefore make find­
ing significantly personality effects more difficult.
Another possible explanation may involve the different sub­
ject makeup of the two sets of tasks.
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Within the eyes open tasks comparisons there was an 
interesting, non-lateralized personality by task interac­
tion. Critics demonstrated less overall average power com­
pared to deniers in the alpha band, suggesting that critics 
utilize both hemispheres more than do deniers for both a 
verbal and a spatial task. The similarity of critics' 
hemispheric usage and Tucker, Dawson and Roth's (in prepara 
tion) finding that a verbal task was associated with less 
overall power compared to a spatial task, suggests that the 
cognition required to perform a left hemisphere task may 
be similar to a critic's characteristic processing style.
Finally, left hemisphere tasks showed lateralized per 
sonality effects and tendencies less clearly than did the 
spatial task or the baseline task. This may have been be­
cause left hemisphere tasks are "hardwired" (Gur & Reivich 
1980) or because left hemisphere tasks may exert more pro­
cessing demand (Tucker, Dawson, & Roth, in preparation) and 
thereby occlude the visability of the personality effects 
due to lowered power.
t Tests on Coherence Data
In the next set of analyses t tests were performed on 
multiple coherences, intrahemispheric partial multiples 
(IAPM's) and interhemispheric partial multiples (IRPM's) 
within each task and band between extreme personality 
types (i.e., t .75 personality factor score).
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Paired-comparisons t tests were also performed in order to 
investigate asymmetrical differences within each band and 
task for a personality type.
Results from asymmetrical comparisons performed on 
multiple coherences demonstrated only two significant 
(p < .05) asymmetries across all bands and tasks. Critics 
evidenced greater right (compared to left) occipital multiple 
coherence during the Relaxation task in the theta band (mean 
aiSFerence = -.053, t = -2.68, p = .03), whereas deniers 
demonstrated greater right (compared to left) temporal co­
herence during the same task (mean difference - -.075, 
t = -2.81, p = .01) in the alpha band. No asymmetrical com­
parisons were significant for either personality type dur­
ing the Word Fluency task.
Asymmetrical comparisons using IAPMs revealed three 
significant differences (p  ^ .05) for the personality types. 
Critics demonstrated greater right frontal lobe coherence 
(mean difference = -.110, t = -2.96, p = .02) and right 
occipital lobe coherence (mean difference = -.080, t = -2.34, 
p = .05) in the theta band during the Relaxation task. With­
in the same task deniers evidenced greater right frontal 
lobe coherence (mean difference = -.100, t = -2.95, p = .01) 
in the alpha band.
Unlike the other two coherence computations, compari­
sons using IRPMs evidenced significant asymmetrical compari­
sons for deniers in both the Relaxation and Word Fluency
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tasks. Deniers demonstrated greater left frontal coherence 
(mean difference = -.023, t = 2.18, p = .05) in the delta 
band and greater left temporal coherence (mean difference = 
-.065, t = -2.75, p = .02) in the alpha band during the Word 
Fluency task. During the Relaxation task deniers evidenced 
greater right occipital coherence (mean difference = -.095, 
t = -2.18, p = .05) in the delta band and greater right fron­
tal coherence (mean difference = -.029, t = -2.30, p = .04) 
in the theta band. Critics demonstrated significant asym- 
metrical IRPM comparisons for only the Relaxation task. 
Critics evidenced greater left occipital coherence in the 
delta (mean difference = .136, t = 3.69, p = .,03), theta 
(mean difference = .104, t = 2.69, p = .03) and alpha (mean 
difference = .183, t = 5.16, p = .001) bands; and greater 
left parietal coherence (mean difference = .050, t = 3.88, 
p = .005) in the alpha band.
Although the findings were not completely consistent 
or easily interpretable there was one finding worthy of 
note. Critics demonstrated higher left than right occipital 
lobe interhemispheric coherence across several bands. No 
other finding demonstrated such a consistent asymmetrical 
difference. Further, no other finding demonstrated prob­
ability low enough to indicate with acceptable certainty 
that the finding was real and not the result of chance fac­
tors. Since 64 mean comparisons were made per coherence 
data type (i.e., multiple, IAPM, IRPM), it was expected
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that at least three comparisons would be significant by 
chance. Across all three coherence data types it would be 
expected that at least nine comparisons would be signifi­
cant by chance. The PEER at .05 resulted in a PCER of .003. 
No single comparison was significant.
Next t tests were performed comparing congruent lobes 
between personality types for each task in each band within 
each coherence data type (see Tables 21 through 24). Three 
significant (p  ^ .05) findings were revealed for the 
multiple coherence data of the Relaxation task. In the 
theta band deniers demonstrated significantly greater left 
occipital coherence than did critics (t =-2.30, p < .03). 
This finding was replicated in the alpha band (t = -2.837, 
p < .01). In the beta band, deniers demonstrated greater 
right temporal coherence (t = -2.039, p < .05) compared to 
critics. No significant comparisons were found within the 
Word Fluency task.
Congruent lobe comparisons made on IAPM coherence 
data revealed no significant findings, and only four sig­
nificant findings within IRPM coherence data. The signifi­
cant congruent lobe comparisons for IRPM coherence data 
occurred in the Relaxation task and revealed that deniers 
had greater intrahemispheric coherence in both occipital 
lobes in the alpha band and both the right parital and 
right occipital lobes in the beta 1 band, compared to
critics.
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Multiple and Partial Multiple Coherences for the 
Relaxation Task for Deniers
Table 21
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Multiple Coherence Means
Delta . 859 . 866 . 736 .762 . 901 . 918 . 903 891Theta . 791 . 798 . 647 .692 . 878 . 888 .848* .833Alpha . 852 .862 . 705 .78 . 896 . 929 .903** .903Beta 1 . 618 . 628 .492 .546* . 787 . 825 . 778 787
Intra- Hemi;spheric Partial Multiple Coherence Means
Delta .499 . 594 .616 .554 . 524 .613 .638 530Theta . 382 . 479 .634 .538 . 406 .533 .667 554Alpha . 329 . 513 . 720 .660 .429 .583 . 759 665Beta 1 . 241 . 370 . 608 .556 . 301 . 408 . 664 585
Inter- Hemispheric Partial Multiple Coherence Means
Delta . 656 . 652 . 397 .376 . 462 .504 . 569 557Theta . 573 . 603 . 303 .329 . 456 .495 .455 468Alpha . 613 .583 . 327 .339 . 517 . 544 .488* .471Beta 1 .401 . 376 .226 .217 . 359 . 394* .383** .381
* p < .05; differs significantly from Word Fluency
** p < .01
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Multiple and Partial Multiple Coherences for the Word Fluency Task for Deniers
Table 22
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Multiple Coherence Means
Delta . 861 . 871 . 741 . 794 . 919 . 930 . 920 . 913Theta . 803 . 819 . 691 . 721 . 878 . 903 . 847 .846Alpha . 769 . 770 .686 . 648 . 862 . 893 . 829 . 848Beta 1 . 585 .557 . 417 . 374 . 771 . 776 . 746 .756
Intra-Hemispheric Partial Multiple Coherence Means
Delta . 535 . 599 . 609 . 507 . 582 . 673 .626 .483Theta . 428 . 538 . 612 . 510 . 468 .575 .643 . 510Alpha . 337 . 715 . 671 . 596 . 344 .467 . 697 .607Beta 1 .261 . 321 . 611 . 555 .260 .264 . 610 .552
Inter- Hemispheric Partial Multiple Coherence Means
Delta . 700 . 678 .436 . 337 . 524 . 542 .616 . 606Theta .635 . 625 . 394 . 388 . 498 . 514 . 486 .496Alpha .566 . 546 . 359 . 294 . 512 . 529 .448 .483Beta 1 . 403 . 362 .161 . 159 . 356 . 374 . 368 .393
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Table 23
Multiple and Partial Multiple Coherences 
for the Relaxation Task 
for Critics
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Multiple Coherence Means
Delta . 852 . 865 .722 .753 . 910 .914 . 823 828Theta . 812 . 839 . 684 .705 . 900 . 907 .766* .833Alpha . 868 . 875 .647 .696 . 901 . 899 .852** .860Beta 1 . 678 . 670 . 359 .411 . 793 . 790 . 724 736
Intra-■Hemispheric Partial Multiple Coherence Means
Delta .451 . 580 . 629 .489 .493 .610 .651 512Theta . 326 .493 . 645 .482 .436 . 545 . 680 562Alpha . 322 .478 . 737 .653 . 346 . 519 . 743 662Beta 1 . 211 . 234 . 606 .536 .242 .274 . 602 535
Inter-■Hemispheric Partial Multiple Coherence Means
Delta . 664 . 664 . 401 .385 . 581 . 583 .437 445Theta . 573 . 584 .299 .289 . 520 . 503 . 378 416Alpha . 705 .694 . 329 .334 . 504 . 454 .370* .321Beta 1 .496 . 454 .159 .192 . 328 . 132 .253** .283
*
*  *
p < .05; differs significantly from Relaxation
p < .01
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Multiple and Partial Multiple Coherences 
for the Word Fluency Task for Critics
Table 24




. 898 . 906 .765 . 812 . 936 .930 .900 . 880Theta . 788 . 812 . 673 .723 . 909 . 912 .847 .848Alpha . 754 .769 . 562 . 674 . 853 .865 .804 . 802Beta 1 . 535 .555 . 331 .380 . 765 .772 .722 .725
Intra-■Hemispheric Partial Multiple iCoherence Means
Delta . 603 . 664 .679 . 574 . 624 . 676 .655 . 534Theta .400 . 523 .673 . 554 .493 . 594 .684 . 557Alpha .281 . 430 .680 .604 . 354 .518 .702 .600Beta 1 .205 .250 .587 . 511 . 222 .299 .610 . 540
Inter- Hemispheric Partial Multiple iCoherence Means
Delta . 774 .736 . 502 . 482 . 592 . 646 .559 .567Theta . 570 . 589 . 394 .391 . 552 . 553 .469 .475Alpha . 556 . 555 .283 . 309 .490 .479 .472 . 428Beta 1 . 383 . 379 .171 . 195 . 311 . 330 .318 .339
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Like the findings of asymmetrical comparisons, the 
congruent lobe comparison findings were not easily inter­
pretable or consistent. Further, no single comparison 
demonstrated a probability low enough (p s .0003) to firmly 
establish it as a non-chance finding.
Although analyses performed on coherence data for 
lobe congruent and asymmetrical lobe comparisons were not 
particularly revealing in terms of the hypotheses of this 
paper, two general observations were made which are of in­
terest. First, of the twenty comparisons which proved to 
be significant (p  ^ .05), only two were within the Word 
Fluency task. This suggests that the Word Fluency task may 
engage both hemispheres similarly and may be less influ­
enced by personality variables than other tasks. Secondly, 
the finding that critics demonstrated greater left than 
right occipital interhemispheric coherence was interesting 




Analysis of personality self-report measures suggested 
that individuals can be characterized along a self-descrip­
tion continuum. Individuals at one extreme describe them­
selves in an unrealistically favorable light (deniers) 
while individuals at the other extreme are overly critical 
in their self-descriptions (critics). Further, comparing 
individuals' self-description biases to brain wave activity 
showed that deniers characteristically utilized the right 
hemisphere more than the left, while critics were less con­
sistent in demonstrating lateralized effects. Yet, when 
significant or near significant asymmetries were observed 
for critics, the asymmetries demonstrated greater left 
hemispheric activation.
Analyses relating electroencephalographic measures to 
the personality factor were performed on two data sets, 
power and coherence. Analyses were performed on power data 
using a self-description factor score as both a continuous 
and a dichotic variable. Multiple regressions, using the 
factor score as a continuous variable, revealed significant 
relationships between the personality types (i.e., critics
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and deniers) and power in all bands. Although the alpha 
oand demonstrated only one significant regression (p i .1), 
the results of regressions within the alpha band tended (in 
three of the four tasks) to suggest that the right temporal 
lobe was most sensitive to personality variation, such that 
deniers demonstrated greater right temporal lobe activation 
compared to that of critics.
As in the alpha band, temporal lobe activation was 
consistently related to personality style such that critics 
demonstrated greater use of their left temporal lobes while 
deniers demonstrated less use of their left temporal lobes. 
Deniers also demonstrated greater right parietal lobe ac­
tivation compared to the activation of right parietal lobe 
of critics. Although deniers generally demonstrated right 
hemispheric activation and critics demonstrated greater left 
activation, paradoxical effects in the regression analyses 
were found in the frontal lobes. For critics the right 
frontal lobe demonstrated more activation. These effects 
were reversed for deniers. These frontal lobe effects are 
consistent with the findings of Tucker et al. (1981) and 
Davidson et al. (1978) and have been interpreted by Tucker 
et al. (1981) as indicating "shutdown" of the hemisphere 
with frontal lobe activity and activation of the hemisphere 
with posterior activity. Specifically, Tucker et al. found 
that depressive affect was associated with right frontal 
lobe activity and, presumably, right posterior hemispheric
shutdown.
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Since the implications for activation are not clearly 
delineated in the literature for the delta and beta 1 bands, 
interpretations df the findings are not offered here. It 
was noted, however, that within the delta band higher right 
frontal and lower left temporal average power were associ­
ated with critic's factor scores relative to deniers. Find­
ings within the beta 1 band demonstrated that only the right 
occipital lobe differentiated the personality types, with 
lower average power predictive of critics and higher average 
powers predictive of deniers.
In the second set of analyses, only the extreme per­
sonality types were selected, those with factor scores fall­
ing + .75 standard deviations above and below the mean.
The rationale was that in so doing the effects due to per­
sonality type would be demonstrated more emphatically than 
if the more flexible personality types with factor scores 
close to the mean were included. Paired comparisons of means 
were performed between the extreme groups.
This set of analyses on power replicated the general 
trends found with the multiple regressions. In general, it 
was found that greater right hemispheric activation was 
associated with deniers; critics demonstrated a relative 
symmetry, with some tendency toward greater left hemispheric 
activity. Surprisingly, the paradoxical frontal effect 
demonstrated in the theta band of the regressions were not 
replicated in analyses on extreme groups, possibly suggesting
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that the paradoxical frontal lobe effect may be the result 
of self-generated or transient emotional experience rather 
than a basic personality trait. This distinction between 
trait and transient emotion is discussed below.
Interestingly, the personality-consistent, asymmetri­
cal hemispheric activity was produced only in the baseline 
and spatial tasks. This finding is consistent with Gur and 
Reivich's (1980) findings and suggests that left hemisphere 
cognitive tasks may be more "hardwired" into the brain and 
therefore less amenable to the influence of "choice" or per­
sonality. Further, eyes closed tasks demonstrated these 
effects more clearly than eyes open tasks. Different results 
may be obtained by comparing a left hemisphere task to a 
right hemisphere task, as opposed to comparing it to a base­
line measure. These differences may also be the direct re­
sult of lower variability of power due to having the eyes 
open.
Although critics did not show significant lateralized 
encephalographic effects, they did show a non-significant 
tendency in both the baseline and spatial tasks to have 
greater left hemispheric activation. It is interesting to 
note that this tendency was repeated across tasks and bands, 
and that this tendency was a clear reversal from the later­
alization trend demonstrated in the left hemispheric cog­
nitive tasks. One possible explanation for the lack of a 
significant lateralization for critics may be due to the 
make-up of this group. When the critic subjects were selected
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in order to maximize lateralized hemispheric activation due 
to personality traits, all members of the critic group were 
females. It has been shown consistently that females are 
less likely than males to demonstrate lateralized brain ac­
tivity (Tucker 1976).
It is also interesting to note that, like the results 
of the multiple regressions, the most frequent personality 
type effects; across sites were seen within the theta band. 
Although some personality effects were also noted within 
alpha, it would appear that these effects were confounded 
with and, at times, masked by the demands of the type of 
task. The theta band therefore appears to be most sensitive 
to personality types (Heinze & Kunkel 1979) and the least 
affected by task demands. It was also noted that the direc­
tion of the effects in theta was the same as in alpha, sug­
gesting that activation in the theta band is equivalent to 
activation in alpha, that is, lower average power indicating 
higher activation.
Comparing critics to deniers revealed differences 
consistent with the right/left hemisphere comparisons. De­
niers appeared to use their right hemispheres more than did 
critics during the baseline tasks, whereas critics tended to 
show symmetrical hemispheric activity which generally was 
not significantly different from the level of power evi­
denced in the deniers' less active left hemispheres. In 
the other tasks, which required some type of processing
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(i.e., verbal or spatial), comparisons between deniers and 
critics were not as consistent as those within the baseline 
task. Critics demonstrated lower average power in both 
hemispheres compared to deniers. This finding may suggest 
that critics characteristically rely more heavily on both 
hemispheres to process a task, or that those tasks we have 
characterized as verbal (i,e., left hemisphere priming) 
tasks may actually require concurrent right hemispheric 
activity, or the brain activation of the critics was non­
specific, diffusely activating the entire cortex.
The preceding findings on the power data seem gener­
ally consistent with the Dawson et al. (in preparation) 
results and suggest that self-description personality traits 
are associated with asymmetrical hemispheric activity as 
well as hemisphere-consistent cognitive abilities. Critics 
demonstrate symmetrical or greater left hemispheric activ­
ity and greater use of verbal and analytical strategies, 
while deniers demonstrate greater right hemispheric activa­
tion and greater use of non-verbal and spatial strategies. 
The fact that the relationship between personality and 
asymmetrical activation was clearly demonstrated in the 
theta band and somewhat in the alpha band implies that 
hemispheric activation may be more closely associated 
with the personality of the subject than the demands of 
the task. Overall, the results of the analyses on the power 
data confirm the relationship between personality and
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lateralized cortical activity and therefore support the util­
ity of a theory which postulates the existence of hemispheric 
personality types.
While the results of analyses on power were straight­
forward and clearly address the relationship between person­
ality and activation, results on coherence were not so con­
sistent or clearly interpretable. Although significant find­
ings within the coherence data were not particularly reveal­
ing, two observations are noteworthy. First, like the find­
ings within the power data, more significant comparisons 
were found during the Relaxation task than the Word Fluency 
task, suggesting that the Relaxation task may place less 
symmetrical processing demand on the hemispheres and thereby 
allow another variable, such as personality, to reveal itself. 
Secondly, the finding that critics had greater left occipi­
tal interhemispheric coherence is interesting because it 
replicates a research finding of Tucker, Roth and Bair (in 
preparation). Although the findings of the analyses on 
coherence data are not presently interpretable, these find­
ings may prove valuable as further explorations of coher­
ence data are performed.
In summary, the results of this study appear to con­
firm the utility of a hemispheric personality type model.
The personality type most descriptive of an individual's 
self-description bias (i.e., denier or critic) appears to 
be predictive of his lateralized hemispheric activation,
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although this predetermined laterality may be less evident 
for left hemispheric cognitive tasks than for right hemis- 
pheric cognitive tasks and baseline tasks. Further, it 
would appear that the effects of personality on brain wave 
activity will be more evident for the theta band than the 
alpha band, and more evident for eyes closed tasks than 
eyes open tasks.
The implications of a hemispheric personality model 
are paramount both for research and for practical applica­
tions of psychological and neuropsychological theory. In 
terms of research, the administration of the self-description 
questionnaires and subsequent factor scoring, using the 
loadings from this study, could provide a covariate which, 
when properly controlled, could lead to clearly delineated 
task effects, particularly for the alpha band. It is evi­
dent that without such controls, a sample might become 
loaded with a specific personality type and as a result, 
produce confounding interations leading to spurious or 
conflicting results as was demonstrated in the results of 
Gevins et al. (1979), who used a selected group of indi­
viduals (laboratory researchers) wnose occupation may have 
been partially determined by their hemispheric preference.
This model could also serve to provide a heuristic 
paradigm with which to understand the conflicting results 
in the areas of emotion, and lateral eye movements. Dif­
ferentiating the use of lateral eye movements in terms of
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type of looker and question-specific response, it is likely 
that the subject's overall LEM response pattern may be 
synonymous with personality type, whereas question-specific 
LEMs may refer to lateralized hemispheric activity only for 
those individuals who are more "flexible" in their cognitive 
approaches to tasks.
As for emotion, if individuals are able to choose 
(Ornstein 1978) their style of cognitive approach to a task 
rather than responding reflexively as suggested by Galin 
(1974), emotional traits such as anxiety, depression, 
euphoria and denial of unpleasant affects may be predictive 
of hemispheric utilization within a given task. This as­
sertion assumes that one's chronic life-long emotional style, 
rather than immediate affective experience, predicts pre­
dominant hemispheric usage. This approach to emotion dif­
fers from that of Davidson et al. (1978) and Tucker et al.
(1981) who looked at acutely experienced emotion, in that 
acute emotional experience may be associated more generally 
with arousal mechanisms and therefore more of a right 
hemispheric phenomena (Tucker 1981), whereas emotional style 
may be more of a conscious "choice" and therefore less tied 
to the right hemisphere.
By viewing emotional style as a result of consicous 
cognitive "choice," possibly influenced by genetics, early 
childhood experiences or continuing schedules of reinforce­
ment, it may be expected that the type of emotion selected
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and its style of presentation will be generally consistent 
with the cognitive personality style of the individual. How­
ever, this does not preclude the experience of overwhelming 
affect which at times may override an individual's ability 
to exercise his characteristic cognitive style. For example, 
one may be a very emotionally controlled, verbal individual 
for the most part, but when faced with a disaster or emer­
gency might become hysterical, and verbally nonsensical. The 
distinction here may be the difference between descending, 
cerebral control (hemispheric personality type) versus as­
cending brain stem and subsequent cortical arousal (e.g., 
catastrophe, immediate fright, remembering or viewing un­
pleasant or frightening scenes, etc.) with the implication 
that the personality type will modulate lateralized activa­
tion until that point that ascending afferent information 
overwhelms normal descending cerebral regulation.
In terms of practical applications, this model sug­
gests that extreme personality types may be associated with 
certain mental health problems, such as character disorders 
and anxiety disorders. This model would imply that ther­
apies providing practice for the client with an opposing 
personality type set of cognitive and/or emotive therapies 
may prove useful. For example, it might be expected that 
individuals who have histrionic personalities will benefit 
from an approach that will increase activation within the 
left hemisphere. Such an approach would probably take the
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form of helping the client to practice affective constraint 
and logical, rational cognition. Tucker, Shearer and Murray 
(1977) explored this proposition by dividing speech anxious 
college students into two groups on the basis of their LEMs 
(i.e., right-lookers versus left-lookers). Assuming that a 
coping strategy opposite in cognitive approach to their pre­
ferred style would have the greatest therapeutic effects, the 
authors had right-lookers (i.e,, critics) use an imagining 
technique while left-lookers were given a verbal strategy 
to cope with their anxiety. Although not significant, the 
results indicated a tendency for students to benefit most 
from a treatment strategy opposite of that which might be 
expected by knowing their characteristic hemispheric utiliza­
tion .
Nevertheless, the hemispheric personality model cannot 
provide a simple framework for selecting an appropriate 
treatment modality because it cannot approach the complexi­
ties of human problems and ways of coping. Rather, the 
hemispheric personality model might be most facilitative 
when viewed in conjunction with traditional theories of 
psychopathology. For example, instead of subjecting an 
obsessive-compulsive patient to a regimen of body cathartic, 
emotional, or non-verbal therapies, a therapist may choose 
to utilize a cognitive, verbal approach to help the client 
gain greater logical control over his anxiety as well as 
teaching him other step-by-step techniques to mentally
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control painful affect, such as meditation and relaxation.
In this case one strengthens hemisphere-congruent coping 
strategies to help the client gain control.
In another approach, the therapist might select a ver­
bal, analytical approach for an obsessive patient, yet might 
emphasize the associative or metaphorical aspects of their 
interactions as opposed to focusing on concrete or purely 
logical progressions in thought. Conversely, a therapist 
might select a more non-verbal, cathartic and emotive thera­
peutic approach for a histrionic patient yet focus on pro­
viding logical, sequential antecedents for the patient's 
therapeutic experiences.
This study, in conjunction with that of Bear and Fedio 
(1977) with an epileptic population, suggests that techniques 
developed to improve diminished cerebral activity may also 
prove useful in therapy with psychiatric patients. For 
example, having an obsessive client draw pictures upside 
down or mentally rotate objects may increase relative right 
hemispheric activation and improve the client's psychiatric 
symptomology. Conversely a neurological patient might also 
benefit from psychotherapy geared to facilitate one person­
ality type or the other.
Beyond providing treatment implications, this theory 
might also provide some diagnostic benefits for patients 
with neurological damage. In neurological cases in which 
obvious signs of neurological damage (e.g., hemiplegia, uni­
lateral spatial neglect, etc.) are not present, a brief
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questionnaire screening might provide some indications of 
possible hemispheric over-utilization and therefore emphasize 
the need for lateral hemispheric investigations by more ex­
pensive or intrusive techniques. Conversely, it might be 
expected that certain types of psychiatric patients will 
demonstrate psychoneurological difficulties which will im­
prove concurrent with a reduction in psychopathology.
Finally, this model provides implications for psycho­
logical and educational development. The emphases in the 
United States for children to use their right hands and to 
develop their analytic-logical minds may cause many un­
tapped resources and abilities to be overlooked. It is pos­
sible that teaching children to effectively utilize both 
hemispheres could increase their learning potential, reduce 
the incidence of learning disabilities and create more "well- 
balanced" personalities. By being sensitive to the person­
ality type dichotomy, teachers might be able to detect 
children early, at a more malleable point, who may begin to 
evidence an over-utilized personality type and by manipula­
tion of learning materials, help the student to modify 
their learning skills, as well as their personalities in 
such a way as to bring them into less conflict with their 
environment. In this case a personality change might be 
effected with minimal personal intrusiveness.
Overall, it would appear that the hemispheric person­
ality model is a viable framework with which to view
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hemispheric activation. This model can serve to provide a 
way of controlling for confounding variance in the study of cog 
nition and emotion, as well as serve as a design for further 
research into personality. Further, this model may prove 
useful in diagnosing and treating various psychological and 
neurological maladies. Finally, this model may serve to 
stimulate educational specialists to consider the need for 
restructuring educational programs to provide for the stimu­
lation of both halves of the brain and therefore help chil­
dren to better realize their potentials both intellectually 
and emotionally.
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